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Time and accident are committing daily havoc on the originals deposited in our public offices. The late war has done the work of centuries
in this business. The lost cannot be recovered, but let us save what
remains; not by vaults and locks which fence them from the public eye
and use in consigning them to the waste of time, but by such multiplication of copies, as shall place them beyond the reach of accident.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Ebenezer Howard ( Feb. 18, 1791), in
3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 211, 211 (H.A. Washington
ed., 1871).1

INTRODUCTION
A cyberattack was causing Iran‘s uranium-enrichment centrifuges to secretly malfunction. The devices, responsible for
concentrating uranium gas to produce a weapons-grade version
of the element, were spinning too fast, based on incorrect instructions from their computer controllers.2 Simultaneously,
those computers were sending reassuring data back to the Iranian engineers monitoring them, painting a false picture of
normal operation.3 Over time, the centrifuges‘ rotors began to
wobble, destroying some of the machines and damaging others.4
1. I thank Bill Merkel for this quote.
2. William J. Broad et al., Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear
Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1.
3. Christopher Williams, Western Power Created Virus to Sabotage Iran‘s
Nuclear Plans, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 22, 2011, at 20.
4. Mark Clayton, Stuxnet Attack on Iran Nuclear Program Came About a
Year Ago, Report Says, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 3, 2011, 4:53 PM), http://
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The concealed overspin set back Iran‘s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by at least three years, according to American
and Israeli intelligence sources.5 The cause: the most sophisticated cyberweapon yet created, known as Stuxnet. Engineered
to activate its payload only when operating within Iran‘s
enrichment system,6 Stuxnet recorded normal operating data,
sped up the rotors, and then fed the recorded data back to the
controllers. It was the ultimate stealth assault.
Stuxnet succeeded where conventional efforts to delay
Iran‘s nuclear ambitions—from diplomacy to threats of force—
had failed.7 Moreover, the superworm operated with utter deniability: although it seems clear that the cyberattack resulted
from a joint Israeli-American operation, there is no concrete
evidence to link the two countries to Stuxnet.8 The hack damaged Iran‘s atomic program to roughly the same degree that a
conventional airstrike would have,9 but without killing Iranian
personnel and revealing the (likely Israeli)10 identity of the
country launching the military attack. From the U.S. perspective, this was the perfect kill: an attack that badly hurt Iran‘s
nuclear enrichment regime, with no human casualties, no harm
to America‘s international image, and no evidence to point conclusively to Stuxnet‘s creators. Exploiting an Iranian cybersecurity weakness proved enormously valuable and perfectly deniable. Stuxnet demonstrates vividly the power of
cyberweapons and the risks of inadequate cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity is a conundrum. Scholars, government officials, journalists, and computer scientists all agree that inadewww.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0103/Stuxnet-attack-on-Iran-nuclear-program-came
-about-a-year-ago-report-says.
5. Broad et al., supra note 2.
6. Kim Zetter, Report: Stuxnet Hit 5 Gateway Targets on Its Way to Iranian Plant, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2011, 8:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2011/02/stuxnet-five-main-target/.
7. See, e.g., Richard A. Falkenrath, Op-Ed., From Bullets to Megabytes,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at A31 (―A sophisticated half-megabyte of computer
code apparently accomplished what a half-decade of United Nations Security
Council resolutions could not.‖).
8. Broad et al., supra note 2.
9. See The Unconventional Attack on Iran, MISSINGPEACE (Nov. 29,
2010, 3:20 PM), http://missingpeace.eu/en/2010/11/the-unconventional-attack
-on-iran (explaining that, because of the potential for reactor meltdown,
―Stuxnet could even be more effective than an airstrike‖).
10. Christopher Williams, Israeli Security Chief Celebrates Stuxnet Cyber
Attack, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 16, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/8326274/Israeli-security-chief-celebrates-Stuxnet-cyber-attack
.html.
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quate security is an emerging threat—perhaps even a catastrophic one—and that preventive action is urgently needed.
However, no one can agree on precisely what cybersecurity
means, or requires. Presidential task forces have recommended
widespread changes to safeguard America‘s cyber-systems;11
scores of bills have been introduced in Congress;12 international
treaties have been mooted.13 By most accounts, the virtual sky
is about to fall. Yet, despite nearly a decade of sustained attention, little, if any, cybersecurity progress has occurred.
This Article argues that the current failure to meaningfully
address this problem occurs because cybersecurity is undertheorized: it is, at best, poorly defined, and it lacks a coherent
framework to guide change. Current scholarship on cybersecurity is moored in doctrinal models that both misdiagnose the
relevant issues and offer answers that would badly damage the
net‘s innovative capacity. Drawing upon scholarship in economics, behavioral biology, and mathematics, this Article seeks to
remedy these shortcomings with a theoretical model oriented
around information, in distinction to the near-obsession with
technological infrastructure demonstrated by contemporary
scholars. This information-based approach to cybersecurity,
which focuses on access and alteration of data and on guaranteeing its integrity, can remediate critical threats.
To implement the theory‘s recommendations, this Article
suggests, counter intuitively, that creating inefficient storage
and network connections best protects cybersecurity. Moreover,
it points out clearly that cybersecurity policy necessitates difficult tradeoffs, particularly between ensuring authorized access
and alteration and preventing unauthorized interaction with
data. This Article outlines implementation through legislation
that requires inefficient data storage for entities holding critical information, mandates testing that redundant storage, and
invests in transitioning organizations to the new regulatory re11. See generally Bill Lane, Cyber Security and Communications, Fed.
Commc‘ns Comm‘n, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/techtopics/techtopics20.html ( last
visited Nov. 7, 2011) (listing presidential directives and task force efforts).
12. See, e.g., Gautham Nagesh, Senators Debate Terms of Cybersecurity
Overhaul, THE HILL (June 29, 2010, 10:33 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon
-valley/technology/106119-senators-debate-terms-of-cybersecurity-overhaul (describing three different bills addressing cybersecurity concerns).
13. See, e.g., John Markoff, Steps Taken to End Impasse Over Cybersecurity Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2010, at A7 (describing a set of cybersecurity
recommendations that mark steps toward a resolution of American opposition
to a Russian-proposed treaty on cybersecurity).
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gime. Next, it describes regulation that generates inefficient
network connectivity by subsidizing interconnection, maintaining links between network providers during disputes, and exploring research into heterogeneous routing as a last-resort option. Lastly, this Article describes the stakes in cybersecurity
debates: adopting current scholarly approaches risks jeopardizing not only the architecture that makes the Internet a potent
medium for innovation and communication, but also key American normative commitments to free expression on-line.
This Article, to be plain, is a significant departure from the
conventional academic wisdom on cybersecurity. Contemporary
scholarly efforts on the topic remain rigidly locked into familiar
doctrinal models, particularly public international law,14 the
law of armed conflict,15 and criminal law.16 While scholars admit that cybersecurity fits poorly in these conceptual boxes,
they nevertheless seek to remold its challenges to fit their
tools.17 Thus, the dominant analytical mode for cybersecurity
concentrates heavily on the identity and intent of the malicious
actor. Susan W. Brenner notes that cybercrime and cyberterrorism encompass similar actions—―only the motivation differs.‖18 Kelly A. Gable classifies cyberterrorism by intent, as
14. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hunker, U.S. International Policy for Cybersecurity:
Five Issues that Won‘t Go Away, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 197, 212
(2010) (―Looking toward existing international regimes that have parallels to
cyber seems a useful way of gaining insight into what an international cybersecurity regime might look like.‖).
15. See, e.g., Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to
Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT‘L
L.J. 179, 190 (2006) (―It is both necessary and appropriate that the same principles of international law intended to regulate conventional armed conflict
and reduce its adverse effects apply to information warfare.‖). See generally
David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY. L.
& POL‘Y 87 (2010) (discussing how the law of war might apply to cyberattacks).
16. See, e.g., Debra Wong Yang & Brian M. Hoffstadt, Countering the Cyber-Crime Threat, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006) (examining familiar
doctrinal models such as ―leaving the burdens of cyber-crime on victim companies, of placing it upon the software and hardware manufacturers, of expanding
the role of governmental regulation, and of a combination of all three options‖).
17. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, ―At Light Speed‖: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379,
379 (2007) (stating that the ―speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult‖ (quoting DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE
CYBERSPACE viii (2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_
Strategy.pdf )).
18. Id. at 399.
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crime ―with the purpose of coercing a government to alter its
policies.‖19 Sean Watts identifies state affiliation as ―an irreducible minimum of lawful participation in CNA [computer network attacks].‖20 Matthew J. Sklerov notes that the ―current
legal paradigm . . . requires attribution to a state or its
agents.‖21 Stephen Dycus states that lack of attribution undercuts deterrence and a state‘s ability to respond to an attack.22
Richard A. Clarke and Robert A. Knake focus on attribution
and its attendant challenges, particularly in proving that a
state is the perpetrator of a cyber-threat.23 Eric T. Jensen describes the ―inability to attribute cyber attacks‖24 as a ―significant problem that plagues cybersecurity,‖25 and that ―complicate[s] a state‘s response‖ to an attack.26 Milton L. Mueller
proposes a new, distributed, peer-produced governance model
to deal with ―difficult-to-trace actions and distributed actors
and attacks that easily cross national borders.‖27 Attributing
Internet actions to a particular actor, and discerning their motivations, is essential for these scholars to employ preexisting
doctrinal responses.
However, attribution of a cyberthreat to a particular actor
on the Internet—to say nothing of divining that actor‘s intent—
is highly difficult given the network‘s open, anonymous, distributed architecture.28 Unsurprisingly, then, nearly all scholars
19. Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT‘L L. 57, 62–63 (2010) (citing BERNADETTE SCHELL & CLEMENS
MARTIN, WEBSTER‘S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 87 (2006)).
20. Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA.
J. INT‘L L. 391, 396 (2010).
21. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who
Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
22. Stephen Dycus, Congress‘s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY
L. & POL‘Y 155, 163–64 (2010).
23. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT A. KNAKE, CYBER WAR 214 –15, 248–52
(2010).
24. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects
of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2010).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1542.
27. MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES 182 (2010).
28. See, e.g., Dycus, supra note 22 (arguing that the ―difficulty identifying
the source of a cyber attack‖ renders traditional deterrence-based policies of
retaliation impractical); Gable, supra note 19, at 102 (discussing how the ease
of ―spoofing‖ IP addresses allows cyberterrorists to ―manipulate and obfuscate‖
their true points of origin, limiting the usefulness of point-of-attack attribution
in assigning blame for cyberterrorist attacks).
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seek to redesign the Internet to improve attribution. By making
it possible, if not mandatory, for data to be linked to its source,
this proposed change would enable legal scholars to remain
comfortably within familiar modes of analysis. Forcing cybersecurity into these traditions, though, has significant negative effects. Requiring attribution undercuts the innovative architecture of the Internet—what Jonathan L. Zittrain terms its
―generativity.‖29 It confers greater control on authoritarian regimes that seek to censor speech, such as China and Iran.30
And it threatens to shift Americans away from shared normative commitments to open communication as a powerful democratizing force.31 Current scholarship, in short, would destroy
the Internet in a futile attempt to save it. This Article proposes
a better path.
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, it describes the
difficulties that previous scholars and policymakers have encountered when attempting to define a theoretical model for
cybersecurity, and how they have reacted by attempting to
force it into existing but ill-fitting paradigms such as international law, the law of armed conflict, and criminal law. This Article describes how this lack of vision produces a dangerous policy agenda: altering the Internet‘s fundamental design to
require attribution of communications. Next, Part II catalogues
the apocalyptic descriptions of cybersecurity risks, which create
a rush to regulate that is likely to be even more harmful than
the chimerical horrors of the risks themselves. Part III draws
upon analogous scholarship in behavioral biology, economics,
and mathematics to produce a radical, insightful new approach
to cybersecurity that is oriented around information. It argues
that an information-based approach requires focusing on the
positive and negative aspects of information access and alteration, with second-order considerations of guaranteeing data integrity. This Article then applies the new theoretical model to
29. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1974, 2030–31 (2006).
30. See generally ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL
INTERNET FILTERING (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the history
and practice of State Internet filtering around the world).
31. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s speech on Internet freedom on
February 15, 2011, is but the latest exemplar. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S.
Sec‘y of State, Address at George Washington University, Internet Rights and
Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked World (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm (discussing state
interference with the Internet during protests in Iran and Egypt and calling
for a global commitment to Internet freedom).
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generate a surprising solution to positive issues of access and
alteration: inefficiency as defense. (The next article in this cybersecurity project will address the negative aspects of access
and alteration.) Part IV details how regulation can achieve
helpful inefficiency in redundant data storage and network
connectivity, and the tradeoffs this prescription creates for preventing unauthorized access and alteration. In Part V, this Article examines how cybersecurity may fundamentally shift
American normative commitments to open communication online, and the risks this creates as authoritarian states employ
security as a pretext for restricting free expression. This Article
concludes by describing the new theory‘s emphasis on resilience, the limits of law as a cybersecurity tool, and other contexts in which inefficiency confers benefits.
Solving cybersecurity‘s conundrum requires a new theoretical approach that prizes information over infrastructure. This
Article shows us how to do that.
I. WHAT IS CYBERSECURITY?
Conceptualizing cybersecurity challenges policymakers and
academics.32 The current theoretical approaches to cybersecurity, though, have proved to be significantly flawed. They employ
definitions that are vague and overbroad; they seek to force cybersecurity‘s issues into the straitjackets of existing doctrines
poorly suited to cybersecurity‘s problems; and they produce
concomitant policy recommendations that not only fail to mitigate, but actually worsen, the Internet‘s security challenges.
Conventional wisdom on cybersecurity identifies the problem as all-encompassing.33 Scholars, government officials, and
journalists tend to view cybersecurity as the ―protection of all
things Internet‖34—an approach that impedes practical
progress by failing to set priorities. Government efforts at capturing cybersecurity‘s scope have been particularly overbroad.
32. The term cybersecurity suffers from what Thomas S. Kuhn calls ―incommensurability‖: although different actors employ the same word, it carries
divergent meanings, assumptions, and value structures for each of them.
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 148– 49 (3d
ed. 1996).
33. See Peter Sommer & Ian Brown, Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity
Risk, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 9–14 (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/44/46889922.pdf (tracing the history of cybersecurity threats and concerns).
34. Jill R. Aitoro, Cybersecurity, NEXTGOV (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www
.nextgov.com/the_basics/tb_20080523_5125.php.
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President Barack H. Obama‘s Cyberspace Policy Review offers
a representative definition, where cybersecurity is:
strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement,
incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and
communications infrastructure.35

Presidential policies have been strikingly consistent. President Barack Obama‘s approach to cybersecurity is almost
identical to the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), the strategy employed by Obama‘s Republican
predecessor, President George W. Bush.36 Their cybersecurity
definitions and programs are closely aligned; indeed, Richard
Clarke and Robert Knake call Obama‘s plan ―CNCI redux.‖37
Both policies build on the recommendations and definitions (in
particular, of critical infrastructure) of President William J.
Clinton‘s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.38
Regardless of political affiliation, American Presidents have
taken an expansive view of cybersecurity.
Proposed federal legislation is equally capacious in approach. The National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act of
2010 defines ―cyber security activities‖ as:
35. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2010) [hereinafter
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/
documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf.
36. See Nat‘l Sec. Council, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/
comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative ( last visited November 7, 2011)
(stating that Obama‘s policies ―build on the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush in National
Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive
23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) in January 2008‖).
37. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 118.
38. THE PRESIDENT‘S COMM. ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROT., CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA‘S INFRASTRUCTURES 3 (Oct. 1997),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pccip.pdf (defining critical infrastructures as those that are ―so vital that their incapacitation or destruction
would have a debilitating impact on defense or economic security‖); see William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 63/NSC-63 ( May 22, 1998),
reprinted in BRIAN T. BENNETT, UNDERSTANDING, ASSESSING, AND RESPONDING TO TERRORISM: PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL
app. 2.2, at 88–99 (2007) (defining critical infrastructures as ―those physical
and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy
and government‖).
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a class or collection of similar cyber security activities by a Federal
agency that involves personally identifiable data that is—
(A) screened by a cyber security system outside of the Federal
agency . . .
(B) transferred, for the purpose of cyber security, outside such
Federal Agency; or
(C) transferred, for the purpose of cyber security, to an element of
the intelligence community.39

The Act conceives of cybersecurity not only broadly—it
could include the Federal Trade Commission‘s anti-spam efforts, for example—but recursively.40 The Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 defines ―information security‖ as ―protecting information and information systems
from disruption or unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction in order to provide‖ integrity, confidentiality, and availability.41 The Homeland Security Cyber and
Physical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2011 proposes cybersecurity requirements that cover ―an occurrence that jeopardizes the security of data or the physical security of a computer
network owned or operated by a Federal agency or covered critical infrastructure,‖42 where critical infrastructure includes
private sector computer systems identified by the Department
of Homeland Security.43 In short, for government policymakers,
there is little that cybersecurity does not cover.
Similarly, legal scholars define the concept expansively.
Gus P. Coldebella and Brian M. White see cybersecurity as encompassing ―criminality of all stripes, nation state and corporate espionage, and attack[s],‖ even while they decry termcreep in the concept.44 Sean M. Condron, of the U.S. Army‘s
Judge Advocate General‘s Legal Center and School,45 defines
39. National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act of 2010, S. 3538, 111th
Cong. § 2(3) (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3538is/
pdf/BILLS-111s3538is.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3480, 111th
Cong. § 3(9) (2010), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=4ee63497-ca5b-4a4b-9bba-04b7f4cb0123.
42. Homeland Security Cyber and Physical Infrastructure Protection Act
of 2011, H.R. 174, 112th Cong. § 221(3) (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr174ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr174ih.pdf.
43. Id. §§ 221(2), 224(e).
44. Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regarding the Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 233,
235–36 (2010).
45. Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 403 (2007).

594

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:584

the problem as attacks on critical infrastructure by ―terrorists,
nation-states, terrorist sympathizers, and thrill seekers,‖46
where critical infrastructure comprises networked computer
systems ―so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.‖47 Susan
Brenner, in her Article classifying cybersecurity risks based on
the actor‘s intent, defines cyberthreats as those ―using computer technology to engage in activity that undermines a society‘s
ability to maintain internal or external order.‖48 Milton L.
Mueller decries the fact that ―the term security now encompasses a host of problems, perhaps too many to fit properly under one word.‖49 However, he then proposes a governance-based
approach to cybersecurity without offering a coherent definition
of the term, and includes spam, phishing, and surveillance as
representative threats.50
Even scholars who purportedly focus on narrower aspects
of cybersecurity employ commodious definitions. Kelly Gable,
who concentrates on cyberterrorism, defines it as ―efforts by
terrorists to use the Internet to hijack computer systems, bring
down the international finance system, or commit analogous
terrorist actions in cyberspace.‖51 A 2001 report by Steven A.
Hildreth of the Congressional Research Service describes cyberwarfare as ―various aspects of defending and attacking information and computer networks in cyberspace, as well as denying an adversary‘s ability to do the same.‖52 Brenner defines
cybercrime as ―the use of computer technology to commit crime;
to engage in activity that threatens a society‘s ability to maintain internal order.‖53 Richard Clarke, former Special Advisor
on Cybersecurity to President George W. Bush, and co-author
Robert Knake even conceive of cybersecurity as encompassing

46. Id. at 404 (citing Michael A. Vatis, Cyber Attacks During the War on
Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis, INST. FOR SECURITY TECH. STUD. AT DARTMOUTH C., 1 (2001), http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs /cyber_a1.pdf ).
47. Id. at 406 (adopting definition from 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006)).
48. Brenner, supra note 17, at 381.
49. MUELLER, supra note 27, at 159.
50. Id. at 165–79.
51. Gable, supra note 19, at 62.
52. STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL3073, CYBERWARFARE, Summary (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30735.pdf.
53. Brenner, supra note 17, at 386.
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intellectual property theft.54 These definitions of cybersecurity
are vague, overbroad, and not helpful. Each attempt at framing
the cybersecurity problem implicitly sets a standard for addressing the problem, for prioritizing it relative to competing
concerns, and for measuring progress. Inaccurate cybersecurity
definitions impede these efforts.
Conceptual failures—shortcomings in theoretical orientation—are largely to blame for what all commentators agree is
an utter lack of success in improving cybersecurity.55 Legal
scholarship has thus far approached cybersecurity questions
from within well-established, comfortable, yet poorly fitting
models from criminal law, national security law, and military
law. These doctrinal frameworks push scholars to concentrate
upon the identity of actors behind a cyberthreat, and to determine their intent.56 The problem is that the Internet‘s design
makes attribution extremely difficult.57 Tracing an attack to a
given computer is challenging; deciphering who operated that
computer during the attack is harder yet; and discerning motive can be nearly impossible.58 The chief culprit, for most
54. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 236–37.
55. See, e.g., NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD A SAFER AND MORE SECURE CYBERSPACE 9–10 (Seymour E. Goodman & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2007)
(―After more than 15 years of reports pointing to an ominous threat, and in
fact more than 15 years in which the threat has objectively grown, why is
there not a national sense of urgency about cybersecurity? Why has action not
been taken to close the gap between the nation‘s cybersecurity posture and the
cyberthreat?‖).
56. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 17, at 438– 40 (discussing the implications of the difficulty of discerning motivations for some cyberattacks); Dycus,
supra note 22 (noting the difficulty of identifying the source of a cyberattack);
Gable, supra note 19, at 105 (arguing for universal jurisdiction for cyberattacks based on the common motivations of ―political, religious, or ideological
causes‖).
57. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 214 –15, 248 (detailing
the troubles that computer forensics experts have in tracing the sources of cyberattacks and the further problem that, even if forensics could trace an attack to a nation-state, the leaders could claim that an anonymous citizen carried it out); NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 46, 49 (discussing
how high-level cyberattackers could conceal their identities); Gable, supra note
19, at 100–02 (describing the technological difficulties of tracking a cyberattack over the Internet); Jensen, supra note 24 (explaining how the relative
anonymity of IP addresses affords attackers, especially foreign governments,
―plausible deniability‖).
58. Attribution must identify both the computer and the operator involved. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 214 –15 (explaining why
simply knowing the computer network in which an attack originates is not sufficient to attribute the attack to a particular actor). Many securitycompromised computers are part of botnets, which are ―network[s] of comput-
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scholars, is the lack of an authentication mechanism in the Internet‘s core TCP/IP protocols.59 The Internet routes data in
best-efforts fashion, regardless of who sent it.60 Indeed, there is
simply no way to verify a sender‘s identity under TCP/IP; functions such as authentication and error-checking are left to
higher-level network layers and applications.61 This default
setting, which permits unattributed communication, is frequently exploited by malefactors—Internet traffic can be generated by botnets of suborned computers available for rent, or
from computers specifically compromised for purposes of an attack.62
Recent cybersecurity incidents illustrate the problem. The
cyberassault on Estonia during that country‘s conflict with
Russia in May 2007 originated in part from computers located
in Brazil and Vietnam.63 The July 2009 denial of service attack
against South Korea and the U.S., widely attributed to North

ers that have been forced to operate on the commands of an unauthorized remote user, usually without the knowledge of their owners or operators.‖ Id. at
282. The malicious programs used to create botnets (―bots‖ or ―robots‖) are extremely difficult to detect; hence, the actor may be unaware of the malicious
manner in which her computer is actually functioning. BERNADETTE SCHELL &
CLEMENS MARTIN, WEBSTER‘S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 42 (2006).
59. See, e.g., Chris Chambers et al., TCP/IP Security, LINUXSECURITY.COM, § 3.2, http://www.linuxsecurity.com/resource_files/documentation/tcpip
-security.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (―The utter lack of authentication
with IP packets is a general weakness with TCP/IP. Without authentication,
there really is no guarantee that a packet comes from where its source field
claims it comes from. This is . . . the major issue in IP security.‖). See generally
Request for Comments 1122: Requirements for Internet Hosts—Communication
Layers, INTERNET ENG. TASK FORCE (R. Braden ed., Oct. 1989), http://
tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1122.pdf (defining Transmission Control Protocol [TCP]
and Internet Protocol [ IP]).
60. E.g., JEAN WALRAND & SHYAM PAREKH, COMMUNICATION NETWORKS:
A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 18–19 (2010).
61. See, e.g., 1 INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 114
(Harold F. Tipton & Micki Krause eds., 5th ed. 2004) (describing higher-level
network layers and applications used to make Internet connections more
secure).
62. NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 115–16; Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker‘s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1058–59, 1067
(2011). See generally Info. Warfare Monitor & Shadowserver Found., Shadows
in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0, SCRIBD (Apr. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Shadows in the Cloud], http://www.shadows-in-the-cloud.net (documenting GhostNet cyberespionage malware).
63. SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS 133–34 (2009); Mark Landler &
John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2007, at A1.
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Korea,64 was launched from computers in Austria, Georgia,
Germany, and even South Korea and America.65 In both cases,
initial judgments that a State (Russia or North Korea) was responsible dissolved into uncertainty in the face of mixed evidence. Attribution is thus an intolerably hard problem for conventional legal approaches. Worse, it is one that flows directly
from the architecture of the Internet.66
Unsurprisingly, the predominant answer to this perceived
shortcoming is to retrofit attribution capabilities into the core
of the Internet. Clarke and Knake want to move to new networks where ―the user‘s authenticated identity could be embedded in each packet.‖67 Jeffrey A. Hunker too believes that
the ―existing Internet architecture is fundamentally insecure.‖68 He seeks to replace the Internet with a network that
allows ―different governments to have different rules,‖ where
governments ―protect their citizens on the Internet the same
way they protect them‖ in other media.69 Former Director of
National Intelligence Mike McConnell argues ―we need to reengineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis and impact assessment . . . more manageable.‖70
Former CIA Director Michael V. Hayden proposes creating a
new, ―hardened enterprise structure‖ for the Internet that

64. Pentagon Official: North Korea Behind Week of Cyber Attacks, FOXNEWS.COM (July 9, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,530781,00.html.
But see Lolita C. Baldor, US Largely Ruling Out North Korea in 2009 Cyber
Attacks, USATODAY (July 6, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/
news/computersecurity/2010-07-06-nkorea-cyber-attacks_N.htm (stating that
U.S. government experts had ―largely ruled out‖ North Korea as the source of
the attacks).
65. D.J. Walker-Morgan, DDoS Attacks with Zombie Computers—‗North
Korea‘s Powerful Hacker Army‘?, THE H SECURITY (July 10, 2009, 1:49 PM),
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/DDoS-attacks-with-zombie-computers
-North-Korea-s-powerful-hacker-army-742435.html.
66. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 214 –15 (discussing how
the structure of the Internet makes attribution of cyberattacks difficult); Gable, supra note 19, at 84 (stating ―[a]s a result of the inherent insecurity of the
TCP/IP Protocol, . . . it is remarkably easy to attack any network that is based
on that protocol,‖ including the Internet).
67. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 275.
68. Hunker, supra note 14, at 207.
69. Id. (quoting Raj Jain, Internet 3.0: Ten Problems with Current Internet
Architecture and Solutions for the Next Generation, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS,
http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/papers/ftp/gina.pdf ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011)).
70. Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-War, Look to the Cold War, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B1.
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would embed identification capabilities into its architecture.71
Stuart Biegel states that ―code-based adjustments in Internet
architecture . . . can go a long way toward countering cyberterrorism.‖72 Greater attribution enables the traditional practice
of deterrence, along with traditional distinctions among criminals, terrorists, soldiers, and spies.73 By building strong attribution into networking protocols, lawyers (and their governments) can apply time-tested ways of thinking and reacting to
threats online. However, trying to redesign the architecture of
the Internet as a solution has at least three critical shortcomings: difficult implementation, unintended consequences, and
loss of generativity.
A. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND NETWORK EFFECTS
First, effecting a change to core Internet protocols would be
extremely difficult. The Internet‘s success and ubiquity rest
largely on the role of TCP/IP as the lingua franca for information exchange.74 Network effects drove adoption: any device using TCP/IP that attaches to the Internet can immediately
communicate with every other point on the Net.75 Changing
TCP/IP would require altering each of those devices‘ networking stacks—no small task when there are over 845 million
hosts directly connected to the Internet.76 Moreover, key stake71. Aliya Sternstein, Former CIA Director: Build a New Internet to Improve Cybersecurity, NEXTGOV (July 6, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/
ng_20110706_1137.php?oref=topnews.
72. STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL?: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS
OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 256–57 (2003).
73. See, e.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 17,
at 113–18 (discussing how more accurate attribution on the Internet can foster
accountability for cyberattacks); Brenner, supra note 17, at 404, 438 (discussing how attribution problems make it difficult to differentiate between crime,
terrorism, and war during cyberattacks).
74. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW
TO STOP IT 60, 67–100 (2008) (explaining that ―if the Internet had been designed with security as its centerpiece, it would never have achieved the kind
of success it was enjoying‖ and describing the ―generative pattern‖ of the Internet, which is essentially the idea that the Internet‘s architecture fosters
innovation).
75. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, RE-THINKING THE NETWORK ECONOMY 13–14
(2002) (defining network effects as the increased benefit in using a network
that comes with the rise in the number of other people using the network).
76. Internet Domain Survey, INTERNET SYS. CONSORTIUM (July 2011),
http://ftp.isc.org/www/survey/reports/current/ (reporting 849,869,781 hosts advertised on the Domain Name System (DNS) as of July 2011). For methodology, see The Domain Survey, INTERNET SYS. CONSORTIUM, http://ftp.isc.org/
www/survey/reports/current/survey.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
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holders such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), operating
system vendors (particularly Microsoft), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and possibly even the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) would have to
come to consensus, not only about the need for such a change,
but also about the method to accomplish it.
Consider two illustrative examples: Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)77 and spam. First, network administrators have
encountered significant delays in migrating from IPv4 to
IPv6.78 This change should be straightforward. IPv6 is compatible with IPv4, at least with certain transition mechanisms,79
and has few controversial features (unlike attribution).80 Furthermore, everyone acknowledges the shift‘s necessity81—the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) distributed the
remaining IPv4 addresses to the five regional Internet registries (RIRs) in February 2011.82 One RIR began a strict IPv4
address delegation policy in April 2011 to postpone IPv4 ex-

77. See generally S. Deering & R. Hinden, Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification (Dec. 1998), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc2460.txt
.pdf (discussing the technical details of IPv6); IPv6, MICROSOFT, http://technet
.microsoft.com/en-us/network/bb530961 ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (introducing
IPv6 and explaining its utility).
78. See Mónica Domingues and Carlos Friaças, Is Global IPv6 Deployment
on Track?, 17 INTERNET RES. 505, 506 (2007) (acknowledging the slow adoption of IPv6).
79. See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Biggest Mistake for IPv6: It‘s Not Backwards Compatible, Developers Admit, NETWORK WORLD ( Mar. 25, 2009, 8:23
AM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/032509-ipv6-mistake.html (noting that, although IPv6 is not backwards compatible on its own, the use of
transition mechanisms can integrate IPv6 with IPv4); see also Carolyn Duffy
Marsan, ‗IPv6 Brokenness‘ Problem Appears Fixed, NETWORK WORLD (July 27,
2011, 3:08 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/072711-ipv6-brokenness
.html.
80. See Deering & Hinden, supra note 77.
81. See, e.g., News Release, The Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), Available Pool of Unallocated IPv4 Internet Addresses
Now Completely Emptied 1 (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/news/
releases/release-03feb11-en.pdf (―[T]he future expansion of the Internet is now
dependant on the successful global deployment of the next generation of Internet protocol, called IPv6.‖).
82. See, e.g., id.; Geoff Huston, IPv4 Address Report, POTAROO, http://www
.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (continuously calculating projected IPv4 address exhaustion); Antone Gonsalves, IP Addresses
Predicted to be Exhausted In 2011, INFORMATIONWEEK (July 27, 2010), http://
www.informationweek.com/news/software/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=226300002.
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haustion.83 And the remaining four RIRs are expected to exhaust their pools of IPv4 addresses within the next three
years.84 Yet IPv6 deployment has been quite slow, to the concern of observers such as the OECD.85 By early 2010, only 5.5%
of Internet-connected networks could handle IPv6; only 0.25%
of Internet users had IPv6 connectivity; and only 0.16% of the
top million sites on the Web offered IPv6 support.86 It is difficult to make even minor changes to ubiquitous standards.87
Next, think about spam. Everyone hates it and there is
widespread consensus about which e-mail messages qualify as
spam.88 Moreover, spam creates a considerable, expensive burden for ISPs: it comprises nearly eighty percent of e-mail traffic.89 Like cybersecurity, spam results from an attribution problem: the protocol for e-mail transfer, Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP), does not verify a sender‘s identity.90 Thus, one
can readily falsify a message‘s source. Re-engineering SMTP to
implement authentication was rejected as too difficult to deploy, given the installed base of e-mail clients and servers.91 Various messaging-related entities—Microsoft, Yahoo!, the IETF—
sought to craft add-on components to deal with attribution.92

83. See Policies for IPv4 Address Space Management in the Asia Pacific
Region, ASIA-PAC. NETWORK INFO. CTR. ( May 9, 2011), http://www.apnic.net/
policy/add-manage-policy.
84. Huston, supra note 82.
85. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNET ADDRESSING:
MEASURING DEPLOYMENT OF IPV6 40– 42 (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/51/44953210.pdf (noting the critical situation
of IPv4 exhaustion and urging for governmental and international cooperation
in transitioning to IPv6).
86. Id. at 4 –5.
87. See LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 225–28 (2009).
88. See DEREK E. BAMBAUER ET AL., INT‘L TELECOMM. UNION, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SPAM LAWS: THE QUEST FOR MODEL LAW 26–27 (2005),
available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_
Comparative_Analysis_of_Spam_Laws.pdf.
89. Mathew J. Schwartz, Spam Plummets to 2009 Levels, INFO.WEEK
(Jan. 26, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/
management/229100295?cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News.
90. See Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An InformationBased Policy Approach to Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH.
5, ¶ 14 (2005), http://www.vjolt.net/vol10/issue2/v10i2_a5-Bambauer.pdf.
91. Id. ¶ 17 & nn.52–53.
92. Id. ¶¶ 34 – 44.
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Efforts to combine the resulting schemes failed,93 and antispam technologies remain fragmented. Network effects, and
competition to define how attribution would work, defeated
protocol changes that might have greatly reduced spam.94
As spam and IPv6 demonstrate, even widespread consensus on a problem created by shortcomings in core Internet protocols, and on the need for a technological solution, may not result in a fix.
B. ATTRIBUTION‘S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The second shortcoming to re-designing the architecture of
the Internet is that attribution is not an unalloyed good and
would have unintended consequences. An authenticated Internet would be one with both fewer viruses and less dissent. It
would change who can communicate, how free they feel to do
so, and the ways in which that information exchange is governed. China, for example, has moved steadily to force users to
employ their real names online.95 Indeed, part of China‘s push
to deploy IPv6 is the country‘s desire to increase attribution
and accountability online.96 With a sufficient number of IP addresses, China could allocate a single permanent address to
each Internet-connected device, and seek to trace data to that
source. Enhancing attribution means facing hard tradeoffs: not
only between values such as security and free expression, but
between different users. American users might benefit from authentication, since their ability to engage in free expression (including anonymously) is protected through law,97 while Chinese
users might suffer, since their government actively impedes
communication on certain topics.98 China‘s government itself
93. Jim Wagner, IETF Shutters E-mail Working Group, INTERNET(Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/
3411461/IETF+Shutters+Email+Working+Group.htm.
94. See Bambauer, supra note 90, ¶¶ 43– 47.
95. See ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER RIGHTS, AND RULE
IN CYBERSPACE 464 –65 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter ACCESS
CONTROLLED]; Peter Foster, China to Force Internet Users to Register Real
Names, The TELEGRAPH ( May 5, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/asia/china/7681709/China-to-force-internet-users-to-register-real
-names.html.
96. Rana Foroohar & Melinda Liu, It‘s China‘s World We‘re Just Living in
It, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 2010, at 36, 38.
97. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm‘n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
98. See ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 95, at 449–87 (documenting
China‘s employment of sophisticated online filtering and surveillance systems
to suppress free speech).
NEWS.COM

602

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:584

might be conflicted: attribution could augment its internal security controls, but weaken its capabilities to mount a deniable
cyberattack. Embedding attribution in the Internet‘s core is not
merely a technical change: it is a choice among competing normative models of how the network should function, and who
should benefit.99
C. FORFEITING GENERATIVITY
The third shortcoming is that greater security through
code may damage the Internet‘s generativity. It is likely to alter the Internet‘s power as a platform for technological innovation. Jonathan Zittrain, Yochai Benkler, David G. Post, Tim
Wu, Barbara van Schewick, and other cyberscholars make the
powerful case that the Internet‘s value as a communications
platform comes from its open, end-to-end architecture.100 No
one need ask permission before creating and deploying a new
application.101 Changing this design by replacing automatic
routing that is identity-agnostic with authenticated communication risks destroying the Net‘s generativity. Attribution requires, at minimum, that data carry an identifying signal, and
that routing devices be designed to inspect, and make decisions
based upon, that information. Even proponents concede this
would slow routing.102 More importantly, it changes the Internet‘s default behavior: anonymous information would go from
being the norm to being suspect. A permission-based Internet
could well suffer the same shortcomings as the circuit-switched
telephone network did in spurring innovation.103 When gatekeepers can veto changes by withholding assent—such as
AT&T‘s objections to network-attached equipment as innocuous

99. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 27, at 180–82 (noting that ―by creating a system of ‗identification‘ on the Internet, we are answering fundamental questions about the nature and scope of government‖).
100. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006);
DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON‘S MOOSE (2009); BARBARA VAN
SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010); ZITTRAIN, supra note 74 passim; J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984); Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo
Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007).
101. See Zittrain, supra note 29.
102. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 161.
103. See Wu & Yoo, supra note 100, at 577–78, 581–83.
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as a rubber mouthpiece designed to make conversations more
private104—they often do, either out of caution or self-interest.
Changing the Internet‘s architecture to enable attribution
is attractive to scholars who need this capability to employ
standard doctrinal models for cybersecurity. However, they fail
to consider the countervailing risks of deployment challenges,
unintended consequences, and loss of generativity. Their proposals to save the Internet could destroy it.
Wide-ranging governmental policies and scholarly efforts
to cram cybersecurity into existing models of thinking reflect
not only comfort with the familiar, but a response to widespread near-panic over a looming cyber-apocalypse.105 The next
Part examines these fears and why they are likely overblown.
II. APOCALYPSE NOW?
Within a quarter of an hour, 157 major metropolitan areas have been
thrown into knots by a nationwide power blackout hitting during rush
hour. Poison gas clouds are wafting toward Wilmington and Houston.
Refineries are burning up oil supplies in several cities. Subways have
crashed in New York, Oakland, Washington, and Los Angeles.
Freight trains have derailed outside major junctions and marshaling
yards on four major railroads. Aircraft are literally falling out of the
sky as a result of midair collisions across the country. Pipelines carrying natural gas to the Northeast have exploded, leaving millions in
the cold. The financial system has frozen solid because of terabytes of
information at data centers being wiped out.106

A. RAGNAROK
Cyberspace is falling—if not now, then soon. Policymakers
are fearful. The National Research Council of the National
Academies warns of a ―digital Pearl Harbor.‖107 Former counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke describes the risk of ―a
massive cyberattack on civilian infrastructure that smacks
down power grids for weeks, halts trains, grounds aircraft, explodes pipelines, and sets fires to refineries.‖108 Senator Harry
104. See Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 267–68 (D.C. Cir.
1956) (noting that intervenors, including AT&T, filed tariffs with the FCC forbidding the attachment of petitioner‘s device to intervenors‘ telephones, even
though the device ―[did] not impair any of the facilities of the telephone
companies‖).
105. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Fourth Quadrant, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2767, 2776 (2010) (―[T]here is rising panic over the situation.‖).
106. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 67.
107. NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 50.
108. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 260.
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M. Reid stated that ―Cyber attack could, for example, bring
down our nation‘s air traffic control system in a matter of
seconds‖;109 Senator Joseph I. Lieberman agreed that the ―future security of the American way of life depends on passage of
comprehensive cyber security legislation.‖110
Scholars and technologists also view the situation in catastrophic terms. Kelly Gable writes of a ―cyber-apocalypse,‖
where ―Al Qaeda replace[s] the White House website with a
message that they have hacked into and shut down [cities‘] major power grids to cripple the U.S. economy . . . .‖111 The chief
security officer for Oracle warned of terrorist attacks on critical
infrastructure, saying, ―‗[M]ove the control rods in and out of
the reactor? There‘s an app for that.‘‖112 Former Direct of National Intelligence Mike McConnell states that a large-scale cyberattack on the U.S. could have global economic effects on ―‗an
order of magnitude surpassing‘ the [terrorist] attacks of September 11 [2001].‖113 Analyst Franz-Stefan Gady writes of the
risk that a botnet based in Africa could ―bring down the world‘s
top 10 leading economies with just a few strokes.‖114 President
Obama‘s Cyberspace Policy Review summarizes the consensus
viewpoint, describing the lack of cybersecurity as ―[o]ne of the
most serious economic and national security threats of the 21st
Century for the United States.‖115
These descriptions are alarmist, and inaccurate.116 Overestimating risks from the Internet, hackers, and software vulner109. Senate Democrats Introduce Legislation Calling for New Safeguards
for National Security, American Economy Against Cyber Attack, U.S. SENATE
DEMOCRATS (Jan. 26, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://democrats.senate.gov/2011/01/26/
senate-democrats-introduce-legislation-calling-for-new-safeguards-for-national
-security-american-economy-against-cyber-attack/.
110. Id.
111. Gable, supra note 19, at 59; see also Dycus, supra note 22, at 156 (―The
very future of the Republic rests on . . . protect[ing] ourselves from enemies
armed with cyber weapons . . . .‖).
112. Elinor Mills, Experts Warn of Catastrophe from Cyberattacks, CNET
NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010, 6:35 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10458759
-245.html.
113. Max Fisher, Fmr. Intelligence Director: New Cyberattack May Be
Worse than 9/11, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/fmr-intelligence-director-new-cyberattack
-may-be-worse-than-9-11/63849/.
114. Franz-Stefan Gady, Africa‘s Cyber WMD, FOREIGN POL‘Y (Mar. 24, 2010),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/24/africas_cyber_wmd?page=full.
115. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 35, at 1.
116. See Evgeny Morozov, Cyber-Scare, BOS. REV., July/Aug. 2009, at 17,
available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR34.4/morozov.php. Compare the
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abilities is common—Paul Ohm refers to the ―myth of the superuser.‖117 They are also not accidental. Increasing the attention
and funding devoted to cybersecurity will benefit important interests, from the software security community,118 to agencies
like the Department of Homeland Security,119 to policy think
tanks.120 Regulatory competition among federal government
agencies has been a recurring theme in Internet security efforts.121 Downplaying risks is not an effective way to gain authority (and a budget) to combat them. Some cybersecurity
commentators also have potential conflicts of interest. Richard
Clarke now operates a consulting firm that offers cybersecurity
risk consulting.122 Stewart A. Baker, former Assistance Secretary for Policy at DHS, who worries about ―freezing in the dark
because of cyberweapons,‖123 is a partner at the law firm of
Steptoe & Johnson, with a practice covering national security
and technology.124 Mike McConnell rejoined the consulting firm
Booz Allen Hamilton as leader of its Intelligence business; the
firm recently received $34 million in government contracts for
cybersecurity.125 This is not to suggest bad faith on the part of
quotes above, supra text accompanying notes 107–15, with dialogue from the
film Live Free or Die Hard, where a character describes ―a three-step systematic attack on the entire national infrastructure. . . . [T]hat‘s why they call it
a fire sale—because everything must go.‖ LIVE FREE OR DIE HARD (20th Century Fox 2007).
117. See Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1333– 40, 1342– 48 (2008).
118. See generally JOHN VIEGA, THE MYTHS OF SECURITY: WHAT THE COMPUTER SECURITY INDUSTRY DOESN‘T WANT YOU TO KNOW (2009) (discussing
the poor state of cybersecurity and suggesting various changes to improve it).
119. Ben Bain, DHS Would Be Cyber Power Center Under Lieberman/Collins Proposal, FED. COMPUTER WK. (June 10, 2010), http://fcw.com/
articles/2010/06/10/web-lieberman-collins-carper.aspx.
120. See, e.g., Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT‘L STUD., http://csis.org/program/commission-cybersecurity
-44th-presidency ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
121. See Coldebella & White, supra note 44, at 233 (identifying the problem
of bureaucratic leadership and accountability as a ―thorny‖ issue in federal cybersecurity).
122. Partners, GOOD HARBOR CONSULTING, http://www.goodharbor.net/team/
index.php ( last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (―Good Harbor is led by Richard A.
Clarke . . . .‖).
123. Stewart Baker, Cyberscam Hits OECD, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Jan. 17, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/01/17/cyberscam-hits-oecd/.
124. Stewart A. Baker, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/
professionals-762.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
125. John M. (Mike) McConnell: Executive Vice President, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON
(Sept. 2010), http://www.boozallen.com/about/leadership/executive
-leadership/McConnell; Ryan Singel, Cyberwar Doomsayer Lands $34 Million in
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these groups or individuals, but rather to state that they have
incentives to convey a compelling image of dramatic cybersecurity threats.
Even fakery may generate overblown claims. Guerrilla
marketing firm The Brainstormclub created a viral video ostensibly showing hackers taking control of the lighting in two
skyscrapers to play a colossal game of Space Invaders.126 A
McAfee Avert Labs researcher wrote that ―[p]erhaps the first
demo was just for fun, but the others will have less juvenile
goals . . . . An attack can involve nationwide damage . . . .‖127
The video, though, was fiction. Although computers created the
giant Space Invaders match, they were Brainstormclub‘s
graphic production ones, not the Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems in the buildings.128 Nonetheless,
McAfee‘s blogger asserted, ―fake or not, the video confirms that
hackers and cybercriminals have got their eyes on SCADA
networks.‖129 Perhaps this is because ―McAfee‘s recent acquisition of Solidcore will help [its] customers‖ secure SCADA systems against cyberattack, or at least rogue marketers.130
Scholars and commentators describe cyberthreats in dramatic, even cataclysmic, terms. These fears have generated a
regulatory stampede, though proposals to date have not only
failed to define the extent of the problem, but also to craft a coherent solution.
B. REACTION
Florid descriptions of imminent, catastrophic risk in cyberspace have produced a rush to regulate cybersecurity.131 Indeed, in the summer of 2010, an election year, over twenty cyGovernment Cyberwar Contracts, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2010, 6:04 PM), http://www
.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/booz-allen/.
126. Urban Hack Attack, BRAINSTORMCLUB, http://brainstormclub.net/project/
urban_hack_attack/ ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
127. Francois Paget, Urban ―Attack‖ on Infrastructure, MCAFEE (May 22, 2009,
6:59 AM), http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/urban-attack-on-infrastructure.
128. See Kevin Poulsen, Viral Video Hoax, or Proof of Impending Cyber
Apocalypse?, WIRED (May 26, 2009, 7:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2009/05/viral-video-hoax-or-proof-of-impending-cyber-apocalypse/.
129. Paget, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. See generally David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power
(2011) (Seton Hall U. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No.
1788333), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1788333 (follow ―One-Click Download‖ hyperlink to download PDF document)
(describing recent cybersecurity legislation).
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bersecurity bills were pending in Congress.132 Regulatory proposals to prevent the fall of cyberspace tend to suffer similar
shortcomings. They fail to describe precisely the cybersecurity
problem which is to be solved, and thereby put forward measures that are either too small or too great in coverage. Purported reforms are often parochial: they focus on shuffling authority for security among government agencies, or between
branches of government. And some proposals are simply stupid:
Stewart Baker believes that users should have to obtain an ―Internet driver‘s license‖ before being permitted online,133 and
Jeffrey Carr, unintentionally copying China‘s approach,134
seeks to compel ISPs to verify their customers‘ real identities.135 This Section reviews recent cybersecurity efforts, and
their failings.
To date, proposals to use law to improve cybersecurity have
been strikingly minimalist (particularly when compared to the
apocalyptic rhetoric used to describe the problem), or, on occasion, incredibly broad. In the minimalist camp, President Obama‘s administration has advanced policies that are highly
deferential in regulating entities such as Internet service providers, equipment manufacturers, and utility operators. Obama‘s sixty-day Cybersecurity Policy Review emphasizes public-private partnerships, information sharing, financial
incentives through procurement strategy and tax benefits, and
investment in research.136 Regulatory mandates, such as requiring private entities to share information with government
cybersecurity officials, are expressly a ―last resort.‖137 Clarke
and Knake note that Obama ―went out of his way to take regu-

132. Gautham Nagesh, Senators Debate Terms of Cybersecurity Overhaul,
THE HILL (June 29, 2010, 10:33 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/
technology/106119-senators-debate-terms-of-cybersecurity-overhaul.
133. John Markoff, Taking the Mystery Out of Web Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 2010, at WK3.
134. Alex Fayette, Chinese Plans to Deanonymize the Internet, OPENNET
INITIATIVE (July 22, 2010), http://opennet.net/blog/2010/07/chinese-plans-to
-deanonymize-the-internet.
135. Seymour Hersh, The Online Threat, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 2010,
at 44, 55. Carr‘s proposal is almost certainly unconstitutional. See McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm‘n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (―[A]n author‘s decision to
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to
the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment.‖).
136. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 35, at iii–v.
137. Id. at 26.
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lation off the table.‖138 For example, Howard Schmidt, the administration‘s coordinator for cybersecurity, endorsed mandatory encryption for Internet communication by firms in the
electrical and power industries.139 However, President Obama
refused to support Schmidt‘s recommendation, citing financial
and logistical costs for affected corporations.140 Even the administration‘s identity management initiative, which addresses
attribution problems widely viewed as central to cybersecurity,
is a voluntary program that contemplates multiple vendors and
optional adoption.141 Many congressional proposals have been
equally small-scale,142 focusing on which executive agency
should lead cybersecurity efforts (typically devolving into a contest between the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security),143 establishing a consortium to train state
and local first responders,144 or setting priorities for research
and development funding.145 In short, where cybersecurity is
concerned, the Obama administration and Congress are usually
chary of legal mandates. (Contrast this reluctance, though,
with the administration‘s willingness to regulate the design of
Internet applications to enable eavesdropping,146 and to ensure
that ISPs retain data to aid law enforcement.147).
138.
139.
140.
141.

CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 118.
Hersh, supra note 135, at 51.
Id.
THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN
CYBERSPACE 11–12 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/rss_viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511.pdf; see James Sterngold, Say
Goodbye to All Those Passwords, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2011, 5:00 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_06/b4214036537462.htm.
142. Coldebella & White, supra note 44, at 242.
143. Compare, e.g., Homeland Security Cyber and Physical Infrastructure
Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 174, 112th Cong. § 222(a)(1) (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr174ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr174ih.pdf
(establishing ―an Office of Cybersecurity and Communications‖ in the Department of Homeland Security), with National Cyber Infrastructure Protection Act of 2010, S.3538, 111th Cong. § 102(a) (2010), available at http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3538is/pdf/BILLS-111s3538is.pdf (establishing a
―National Cyber Center‖ in the Department of Defense).
144. Cyber Security Domestic Preparedness Act, H.R. 4507, 111th Cong.
§ 226(b) (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4507ih/
pdf/BILLS-111hr4507ih.pdf.
145. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010, H.R. 4061, 111th Cong.
§§ 101–113 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4061eh/
pdf/BILLS-111hr4061eh.pdf (as passed by House, Feb. 4, 2010).
146. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Is Working to Ease Wiretaps on the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A1.
147. Jaikumar Vijayun, DOJ Seeks Mandatory Data Retention Require-
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Minimalist approaches contemplate a minor role for government in cybersecurity, with considerable deference to private sector efforts and standards. This reticence is in tension
with apocalyptic views of cyberthreats, as threats to national
well-being typically involve significant government mandates.
(The federal takeover of airport security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is but one example.)148
However, deference is widely favored. Gregory T. Nojeim, senior counsel for the Center for Democracy & Technology, who
worries about civil liberties, argues that ―[c]ybersecurity solutions that favor industry standards over government technology mandates will enhance security more efficiently and flexibly
than those that do not.‖149 Coldebella and White state that
―owners of critical infrastructure have had the incentive to develop cybersecurity measures that are suited to their businesses,‖ and thus any ―centrally planned, one-size-fits-all regulatory
scheme would almost certainly eliminate useful, industrydeveloped security measures and replace them with an illfitting, nondynamic slate of requirements.‖150 There is a persistent reluctance to second-guess private sector cybersecurity decisions.
The proposed legislation garnering the most attention,
however, is the infamous ―kill switch‖ bill, which demonstrates
cybersecurity law at its most grandiose. Senators Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins introduced a wide-ranging bill that
would increase funding for implementing security measures,
bolster information sharing between the public and private sectors, create security standards for federal agencies, and—most
controversially—confer broad emergency powers on the U.S.
President to protect critical infrastructure.151 The legislation
would enable the President, when confronted with a cyberemergency, to compel owners and operators of critical inframent for ISPs, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 25, 2011, 8:15 PM), http://www
.computerworld.com/s/article/9206379/DOJ_seeks_mandatory_data_retention_
requirement_for_ISPs.
148. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597 (2001).
149. Gregory T. Nojeim, Cybersecurity and Freedom on the Internet, 4
NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 119, 120 (2010).
150. Coldebella & White, supra note 44, at 241.
151. See Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3480,
111th Cong. §§ 102(a), 246, 249(a) (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BILLS-111s3480is/pdf/BILLS-111s3480is.pdf; see also Declan McCullagh,
Internet ‗Kill Switch‘ Bill Will Return, CNET NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20029282-281.html?tag=topStories1.
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structure to implement emergency plans, including stopping
data flow.152 The bill received widespread criticism,153 particularly after the government of Egypt ordered that country‘s major ISPs to cease routing data during anti-government protests
in early 2011.154 The underlying concept of the legislation—to
allow America to ―pull up the drawbridge‖ in case of a cyberattack—is one supported by commentators such as Clarke and
Knake.155 It plainly involves substantial augmentation of the
government‘s control over private Internet infrastructure, although proponents contend the President has similar authority
under the Communications Act of 1934.156 The ―kill switch‖ legislation runs counter to the trend of minimalist proposals for
legal regulation of cybersecurity, which accounts in part for the
heated opposition to the bill.157
The Lieberman-Collins bill, even if passed and signed into
law, is unlikely to advance cybersecurity much, for three reasons. First, the bill is redundant: it is inconceivable that a network that was the source or conduit of cyberattacks would
refuse to deal with the problem, or to cooperate with government efforts to do so.158 Any provider sufficiently removed from
American suasive pressures would likely also be immune from
legal enforcement. Second, disconnecting networks is as likely
to worsen the effects of a cybersecurity problem as to ameliorate them. Shutting down ISPs burdens legitimate uses at the
same time it counteracts illegitimate ones. From an information perspective, reducing connectivity decreases authorized
access to information, while also cutting the number of targets
152. S. 3480 § 249(a).
153. ACLU Protests ―Internet Kill Switch‖, KTAR.COM (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://ktar.com/?nid=6&sid=1323951; David Kravets, Internet ―Kill Switch‖
Legislation Back in Play, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2011, 6:09 PM), http://www.wired
.com/threatlevel/2011/01/kill-switch-legislation/; Statement on LiebermanCollins-Carper Cybersecurity Bill, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (June
10, 2010), http://www.cdt.org/pr_statement/statement-lieberman-collins-carper
-cybersecurity-bill.
154. David Zax, Could Egypt Happen Here? Obama‘s Internet ―Kill Switch‖,
FAST COMPANY (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.fastcompany.com/1721753/egypt
-internet-kill-switch.
155. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 216.
156. See 47 U.S.C. § 606(c) (2006).
157. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Internet ‗Kill Switch‘ Bill Gets a Makeover, CNET NEWS (Feb. 18, 2011, 6:27 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3
-20033717-281.html (describing ACLU opposition).
158. Cf. Ben Rooney, Amazon‘s WikiLeaks Response Threatens Cloud Computing, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/
2010/12/13/amazons-wikileaks-response-threatens-cloud-computing/.
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for an attacker. Third, if the model for disconnection follows
Clark and Knake‘s ―drawbridge‖ metaphor, where the key to
mitigating an attack is to break contact with the wider Internet, then the kill switch will fail. Any serious cyberthreat
would be launched from networks within the U.S. as well as (or
instead of) outside it. Indeed, the cyberattacks against South
Korea emanated in part from computers within that country.159
The Stuxnet cyberweapon was introduced into Iran‘s computers
from within that state.160 Even Clarke and Knake admit that
attacks would be launched from domestic networks as well as
foreign ones.161 It is useless to raise the drawbridge when the
attackers are inside the castle. Thus, legal efforts to date,
whether cautious or outsized, hold little promise of increasing
cybersecurity.
Joint public-private efforts to date have focused primarily
on encouraging private sector entities to increase their security,
and to share data with the federal government. There is consensus, though, that information sharing has noticeably
failed.162 Owners of critical infrastructure have been reluctant
to share information on intrusions and other cyberthreats. Explanations for this unwillingness include ―fear [of] enforcement
actions by regulators, suits by plaintiffs‘ lawyers, and criticism
associated with public disclosure of security failures,‖163 along
with concerns about censure from civil liberties advocates.164
(The latter worry is entirely plausible; Nojeim argues that routine information sharing between providers and the government would be unlawful.)165 Commentators have suggested remedying the shortcomings of suasive, norms-based models of
information exchange by reshaping incentives through legislation. Thus, Coldebella and White suggest using law to eradicate
the ―structural disincentives‖ that, in their view, impede sharing vulnerability and incident data with other industry entities
and with the government.166 It is not clear, however, why the

159. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
160. John Markoff, Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at A15.
161. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 209.
162. Nojeim, supra note 149, at 126.
163. Coldebella & White, supra note 44, at 237.
164. See, e.g., Nojeim, supra note 149, at 126.
165. Id.
166. Coldebella & White, supra note 44, at 236–37.
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multiple existing protections for confidential reporting by the
private sector to government actors are inadequate.167
Both government and private sector cybersecurity proposals typically involve using code to fight code. For example, the
Department of Homeland Security has moved to implement its
Einstein 3 program, which will monitor the networks of critical
infrastructure operators in realtime.168 Similarly, the National
Security Agency is reportedly deploying sensors to monitor
networks of critical infrastructure providers under a program
called, in Orwellian fashion, ―Perfect Citizen,‖169 although the
NSA claims the system is only a vulnerability assessment
tool.170 Clarke and Knake propose that Internet users be required to use anti-virus programs on their computers,171 and
the vice president of Microsoft‘s Trustworthy Computing Group
thinks consumers ought to have to produce an electronic
―health certificate‖ before interacting with critical data online.172 And, as previously described, proposals to alter the Internet‘s protocols to enable attribution have proliferated. The
scope of code-based solutions, and who is responsible for determining that scope, remains a contested issue.
Existing proposals to address cybersecurity are rooted in
dated theoretical approaches that are poorly suited to the issue‘s challenges. They range between highly radical, such as
suggestions to give the U.S. President power to disconnect from
the wider Internet, to painfully minimalist, such as bills that
move cybersecurity responsibility among federal agencies like a
shell game. These alleged reforms are reacting to a threat that
is perceived to be immediate and grave. As the next Section describes, though, this perception is fundamentally flawed.
167. See id. at 241 (―Under the protection of PCII and through CIPAC,
owners of critical infrastructure may share information with DHS about network intrusions without significant risk.‖).
168. U.S. DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
INITIATIVE THREE EXERCISE 2–3 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_nppd_initiative3.pdf; Dawn Lim, DHS
Testing Einstein 3, NEXTGOV (Apr. 8, 2010, 4:28 PM), http://techinsider
.nextgov.com/2010/04/testing_of_einstein_3_underway_dhs.php.
169. Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies,
WALL ST. J., July 8, 2010, at A3.
170. Lance Whitney, NSA Offers Explanation of Perfect Citizen, CNET (July 9, 2010, 12:53 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-20010155-83.html.
171. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 165.
172. Robert McMillan, Microsoft Has a Change of Heart on How to Keep
Internet Safe, ITWORLD (Feb. 15, 2011, 8:57 PM), http://www.itworld.com/
security/137159/microsoft-has-a-change-heart-how-keep-internet-safe.
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C. REALITY
The Internet is designed for exactly the challenge that cyberattacks produce: disruption to segments of the network that
force re-routing of data, with the concomitant risk of lost information.173 Moreover, there is good indirect evidence to believe
that apocalyptic descriptions of cyberthreats are overdrawn.
Accidents and natural disasters mimic the effects of deliberate
disruption of Internet traffic. For example, undersea fiber-optic
cables, which route much of the world‘s Internet data,174 are
routinely damaged or severed by events such as typhoons175
and hurricanes.176 Short-term effects can be significant: an
earthquake in Taiwan in December 2006 cut four major fiberoptic cables, disrupting traffic moving east from Asia.177 Taiwan‘s largest telecommunications company reported that ninety-eight percent of communication to Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand was taken offline.178 When two undersea cables in the Mediterranean Sea were cut simultaneously
in 2008, many Internet users in the Middle East and Asia were
forced offline, including an estimated sixty percent of India‘s
web services.179 This example is particularly applicable, as affected network providers anticipated damage to only one cable
at a time and employed the second cable as a precaution.180
Damage to both cables more closely approximates the effects of
173. Electronic Frontier Foundation co-founder John Gilmore famously
stated that ―The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.‖
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 64.
174. Heather Timmons, Ruptures Call Safety of Internet Cables into Question, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/technology/
04iht-cables.4.9732641.html.
175. See, e.g., Dan Nystedt, Typhoon Morakot Severs Three Undersea
Cables, PCWORLD (Aug. 12, 2009, 10:50 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/
businesscenter/article/170126/typhoon_morakot_severs_three_undersea_internet_
cables.html.
176. See, e.g., Dan Nystedt, Taiwan Earthquake Damages Undersea Internet Cables, ITWORLD ( Mar. 5, 2010, 7:40 AM), http://www.itworld.com/
networking/99140/taiwan-earthquake-damages-undersea-internet-cables.
177. Ryan Singel, Fiber Optic Cable Cuts Isolate Millions From Internet,
Future Cuts Likely, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2008, 8:59 AM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2008/01/fiber-optic-cab/.
178. Chris Williams, Taiwan Earthquake Shakes Internet, THE REG. (Dec.
27, 2006, 10:13 GMT), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/12/27/boxing_day_
earthquake_taiwan/.
179. Murad Ahmed, India Suffers Massive Internet Disruption After Undersea Cables Break, TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), http://technology.timesonline
.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article5372294.ece.
180. Id.
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a deliberate attack on the network. Similarly, the only fiberoptic cable running to West Africa was damaged in July 2009,
causing significant impairment to Internet usage in Nigeria
(which suffered loss of approximately seventy percent of its
bandwidth), Togo, and Niger.181 The March 2011 earthquake
near Japan damaged undersea telecommunications cables and
their associated routers, affecting Internet traffic in Asia.182
The effects from these outages are similar to those of a cyberattack—indeed, there was speculation that the 2008 cable damage was caused by sabotage, with even the International Telecommunication Union advancing that theory.183
Hurricane Katrina had even greater effects on communications in the affected area of the southeastern United States in
2005; indeed, one researcher describes the storm as ―the equivalent of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on the
Gulf Coast.‖184 The storm destroyed or disabled most communications capabilities in the area,185 through a combination of
physical damage (such as with cellular phone towers) and power outages (such as with landline phone service).186 SCADA systems in utilities and other critical infrastructure were similarly
disabled.187 This multi-modal failure of critical infrastructure
likely mimics the effects of a significant cyberattack.
However, even with major outages, data still flows. Within
a few days of the 2006 Taiwan cable outage, alternative data
paths were activated, international telephone links were restored, and Internet services came back on-line.188 Physical re181. Cable Fault Cuts off West Africa, BBC NEWS (July 30, 2009, 10:48),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8176014.stm.
182. Om Malik, In Japan, Many Undersea Cables Are Damaged, GIGAOM
( Mar. 14, 2011, 10:34 AM), http://gigaom.com/broadband/in-japan-many-under
-sea-cables-are-damaged/.
183. Saboteurs May Have Cut Mideast Telecom Cables: UN Agency, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 19, 2008, 3:50 AM), http://news.smh.com.au/
technology/saboteurs-may-have-cut-mideast-telecom-cables-un-agency-20080219
-1sv3.html.
184. Robert Miller, Hurricane Katrina: Communications & Infrastructure
Impacts, in THREATS AT OUR THRESHOLD 191, 191 (Bert B. Tussing ed., 2006),
available at http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/CHDSA2006.pdf.
185. See, e.g., Heather K. Meeds, Communication Challenges During Incidents of National Significance: A Lesson from Hurricane Katrina 14 ( Mar. 15,
2006) (unpublished student report, U.S. Army War College), available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil424.pdf.
186. Miller, supra note184, at 193–94.
187. Id. at 194.
188. See, e.g., Submarine Cable Protection—Experience of Hong Kong,
China: Workshop and Information Sharing on Submarine Cable Protection,
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pairs to the affected cables took longer, but were completed
within fifty days.189 Similarly, providers quickly re-routed traffic during disruptions caused by the 2008 cable incidents;190 one
Indian ISP restored service to normal levels within twenty-four
hours.191 The SAT-3 cable in West Africa that was damaged in
2009 was repaired within three weeks.192 While poorer countries such as Niger, which rely solely on the SAT-3 cable, were
effectively cut off from the Internet during this period, other
states were able to shift to (admittedly more expensive) satellite links as an alternative.193 Most networks in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama were restored to service within several days of their initial outage, although a minority of networks remained persistently offline.194 Japanese networks affected by the earthquake recovered quickly due to the country‘s
―dense web of domestic and international connectivity.‖195
Thus, while damage to Internet connectivity from disasters can
be significant, it is also generally repaired rapidly.
There is a second source of data to evaluate the likely effects of a cyberattack: physical attacks. For example, the attack
on Manhattan‘s World Trade Center towers on September 11,
2001, caused extensive damage to financial networks and data.
The Verizon central switching office that serves most of lower
Manhattan was damaged in the attack and in subsequent rescue efforts, cutting off 34,000 businesses and residences, and
OFFICE OF TELECOMMS. AUTH. (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/
speech-presentation/2009/20090413.pdf (PowerPoint presentation by Lawrence
S M Kwan).
189. Singel, supra note 177.
190. Third Undersea Internet Cable Cut in Mideast, CNN (Feb. 1, 2008),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/02/01/internet.outage/; Timmons, supra note 174.
191. Zafar Anjum, India‘s VSNL Helps Restore Internet After Cable Break,
NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 6, 2008, 9:37 AM), http://www.networkworld.com/
news/2008/020508-indias-vsnl-helps-restore-internet.html.
192. Disrupted SAT3 Service Restored in West Africa, BALANCING ACT
(Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-no-468/
internet/disrupted-sat3-service-restored-in-west-africa.
193. Cable Fault Cuts off West Africa, supra note 181; Internet Blackout in
Niger: Niger‘s Dependence on the Damaged Beninese Fibre Optic Cable, ASS‘N
FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMC‘NS (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.apc.org/en/news/
internet-blackout-niger-niger-s-dependence-damaged.
194. James Cowie, et al., Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Internet Infrastructure, RENESYS, 4 –5 (Sept. 9, 2005), http://www.renesys.com/tech/
presentations/pdf/Renesys-Katrina-Report-9sep2005.pdf.
195. James Cowie, Japan Quake, RENESYS ( Mar. 11, 2011, 7:20 PM),
http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/03/japan-quake.shtml.
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severing 11,000 lines serving ISPs.196 Even some companies
that had invested in redundant Internet access lost transmission capabilities because their network providers routed the
(putatively redundant) lines through the single Verizon physical plant.197 Companies such as Hartford Financial Products
suffered the complete physical destruction of their corporate
headquarters and associated data center and information.198
Yet, even with this massive physical destruction of Internet capabilities, financial networks and companies returned to
online operations rapidly. U.S. trading markets, such as the
New York Stock Exchange, resumed normal operations six days
after the attack.199 Verizon began restoring some services as
early as September 14.200 Hartford Financial Products had its
computers operating by September 14, and had moved into
substitute offices by September 17.201 The repair work necessary to restore communications was likely more extensive than
would be required from a cyberattack, as it required not only
resupply and routing of physical connectivity (in some cases up
the sides of buildings), but also the reconstruction of Verizon‘s
cable vault in the central office.202
Internet communication is thus quite hardy, particularly in
America. Moreover, loss of routing is commonplace, and providers have experience managing the problem. Disruptions due to
undersea cable damage, for example, are ubiquitous, though
they affect primarily African nations with few alternative
routing paths.203 In the U.S., Internet-based service has proven
to have greater resilience than other telecommunications meth196. GAO, GAO-03-414, POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACKS: ADDITIONAL ACNEEDED TO BETTER PREPARE CRITICAL FINANCIAL MARKET PARTICI9, 37–39, 90–91 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03251.pdf.
197. Id. at 92–94.
198. See Julie Gallagher, Importance of Redundancy, Diverse Systems
Grows Post-9/11, Stresses Hartford Financial‘s Lowenthal, INS. & TECH. (Oct.
24, 2001), http://www.insurancetech.com/architecture-infrastructure/14706497
(stating that the headquarters facility suffered ―complete destruction,‖ but also noting that the company maintained ―a hot site in Boston‖ to protect critical
information and records).
199. GAO, supra note 196, at 94.
200. Id. at 96.
201. Gallagher, supra note 198.
202. GAO, supra note 196, at 42– 43.
203. John Borland, Analyzing the Internet Collapse, TECH. REV. (Feb. 5,
2008), http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/20152/; Ryan Singel, Cable
Cut Fever Grips the Web, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2008, 1:50 PM), http://www.wired
.com/threatlevel/2008/02/who-cut-the-cab/.
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ods. For example, during Hurricane Katrina and subsequent
flooding in Louisiana in 2005, landline telephone circuits, the
State Police radio system, and cellular phone networks all
failed.204 One local ISP was able to maintain some Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service even during the disaster,
and the State Police used VoIP to communicate over their
intranet (though traffic overwhelmed their network when they
allowed unrestricted Internet use).205 Indeed, one recommendation emerging from Katrina was that local law enforcement and
government should move to an Internet (IP-based) architecture
for emergency communication due to its robustness and flexibility.206
The Internet‘s core design anticipates that damage may occur to component networks. Thus, data routes dynamically,
along the best available path at that moment.207 TCP/IP does
not guarantee packet delivery; indeed, packet loss is common,
and is anticipated by applications that use the Internet.208 In
short, the Internet is designed for precisely the type of threat
that cyberattacks pose. As one telecom analyst put it, ―there
will always be outages . . . . We are used to thinking of the Internet as being a thing that goes down.‖209 While it is possible
that a cyberattack could greatly reduce or eliminate Internet
connectivity, it is unlikely. America in particular has robust,
redundant connectivity to the rest of the world.
Even deliberate attempts by major ISPs to interfere with
traffic flow as a competitive tactic fail. For example, in March
2008, Cogent Communications and the Swedish provider TeliaSonera stopped accepting traffic from each other‘s networks
(known as ―de-peering‖).210 Cogent claimed that TeliaSonera
failed to provide adequate bandwidth at interconnection points,
and TeliaSonera argued that Cogent owed it compensation for
204. National Science Board Workshop: Task Force on Hurricane Science
and Engineering, NAT‘L SCI. FOUND., 5–6 (Apr. 18, 2006), http://www.nsf.gov/
nsb/committees/archive/hurricane/3/henry.pdf (PowerPoint presentation by
Robert R. Henry).
205. Id. at 5, 9.
206. Id. at 9.
207. JEFF DOYLE & JENNIFER CARROLL, ROUTING TCP/IP 131– 41 (2006).
208. MATTHEW J. CASTELLI, NETWORK CONSULTANTS HANDBOOK 574
(2002).
209. Singel, supra note 177 (quoting Todd Underwood, a vice president of
Renesys).
210. Ryan Singel, ISP Quarrel Partitions Internet, WIRED ( Mar. 18, 2008,
4:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/03/isp-quarrel-par/.
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carrying traffic.211 However, Swedes could still reach sites
hosted on Cogent‘s network, and vice versa; it appears that the
only entity made inaccessible by the dispute was Martha Stewart Living, and only from Sweden.212 Other ISPs carried traffic
between the warring firms, slowing access but enabling it to
continue. Thus, even if a cyberattack were to disrupt a major
ISP, or its connections to a peer, Internet access would likely
continue largely unabated.
There is one key difference between natural disasters, and
even some human-generated ones (such as the September 11
terror attacks): these disruptions are not adaptive, or ongoing.
Though responders to Katrina, 9/11, and the Asian cable
breaks faced challenging physical and communications conditions, they did not confront deliberate, changing impediments
to their efforts.213 A major cyberattack would likely attempt to
degrade or prevent mitigation efforts, and could include physical attacks that would make rerouting efforts more difficult or
impossible. Thus, existing disaster examples demonstrate oneoff problems, but cannot show how Internet connectivity would
respond to adaptive, ongoing attempts to disrupt it and to block
repairs. Nonetheless, available data suggest that risks have
been considerably overstated.
Even a significant cyberattack, though, would be more limited than commonly portrayed. Cybersecurity threats will be
specifically targeted, rather than attacking the Internet as a
whole. Claims to the contrary, while common, are either sloppy
or simply wrong.214 Moreover, there are at least two additional
constraints that suggest attacks will target specific systems
and information. First, some attackers—particularly nationstates—have significant Internet dependencies as well. China,
for example, is linked into the global financial system via the
Internet, and has integration in other economic sectors as

211. Tom Corellis, Internet Rift Opens over ISP Peering Dispute, DAILYTECH ( Mar. 22, 2008, 8:15 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/Internet+Rift+Opens+
over+ISP+Peering+Dispute/article11199.htm.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 184, at 200 (stating ―with Katrina we had
plenty of warning and we knew there wasn‘t likely to be a second onslaught . . . .‖). See generally CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 17–21 (describing Russian response to Georgian countermeasures during cyberattack).
214. Gable, for example, states that ―[c]yberterrorists can attack the Internet itself.‖ Gable, supra note 19, at 80.
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well.215 This point should not be overstated—political theorists
famously predicted in the years before World War I that Europe‘s economies were too conjoined to permit conflict to
erupt,216 and attackers such as North Korea have little to lose if
the Internet goes offline217—but the possibility of suffering selfinflicted damage should moderate the scope of attacks. This
analysis accords with military theory suggesting that attackers
generally leave room to escalate the level or severity of attacks,
so as to push their enemy to quit the fight.218 This ―escalation
dominance‖ would likely also influence a state launching cyberwar to focus its attacks, and to leave space for increased
pressure.219
Second, a cyberattack on a country with military power,
such as the United States, would invite reprisal in conventional
(kinetic) terms even if attribution were only probabilistic or uncertain.220 Indeed, after the alleged North Korean cyberattack
on the U.S. and South Korea, the ranking Republican member
of the Intelligence Committee of the House of Representatives
called for a ―show of force or strength‖ against that country,
though North Korea‘s role was not free from doubt.221 The
broader the attack (and concomitant damage), the more likely
that a response would involve conventional weapons.222 In addition, an attack launched from computers in third-party countries, to disguise its origins, might cause those states to treat
215. The Explosion of E-Commerce in China, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 28,
2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/201296-the-explosion-of-e-commerce-in
-china.
216. See, e.g., NORMAN ANGEL, THE GREAT ILLUSION—A STUDY OF THE
RELATION OF MILITARY POWER TO NATIONAL ADVANTAGE (1912 ed.).
217. Martyn Williams, North Korea Opens up Internet for National Anniversary, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 9, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.computerworld
.com/s/article/9190238/North_Korea_opens_up_Internet_for_national_annivers
ary (noting North Korea made its first full Internet connection in late 2010).
218. See, e.g., FORREST E. MORGANET AL., DANGEROUS THRESHOLDS: MANAGING ESCALATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 14 –18 (2008).
219. Cf. HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS
289–91 (Transaction Publishers 2010) (1965) (showing that the escalation
dominance theory can apply to a broad set of circumstances).
220. The U.S. military claims to have improved its ability to determine responsibility for cyber attacks. Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press, Officials:
U.S. Better at Finding Cyber Attackers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9472832.
221. Kim Zetter, Lawmaker Wants ―Show of Force‖ Against North Korea for
Website Attacks, WIRED (July 10, 2009, 1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2009/07/show-of-force/.
222. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 176–78.
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the attacker as a belligerent, and possibly to carry out reprisals
against it.
There is significant evidence to support these contentions.
To date, hackers and spies have struck specific targets—for example, data on the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter,223 funds in a
bank‘s accounts,224 overseas political opponents of a government,225 or key equipment in a nuclear enrichment facility226—
rather than assaulting Internet connectivity in general. In cases of cyberwar particularly, attackers have mounted assaults
with a specific focus: combatants‘ systems, and their data. The
cyberattack on Estonia sought to alter Web pages of that country‘s government, to prevent Estonian citizens from accessing
news sites, and to discourage other countries from accepting Internet traffic from Estonia.227 Even North Korea—commonly
described as the state most likely to wage all-out cyberwar, given its limited information systems exposure to reprisal—has
been judicious in its attacks so far.228 The distributed denial of
service attack attributed to North Korea aimed at specific targets: websites of selected U.S. government agencies, such as the
Department of State and the Secret Service; major financial institutions such as the New York Stock Exchange; South Korean
government websites; and South Korean banks. Clarke and
Knake, whose book Cyber War argues that cyberattack threats
are considerable in scale, call the North Korean attack ―controlled‖ and ―fairly sophisticated.‖229 Cyberattackers are not nihilists. They have not sought to bring the Internet down as an
end in itself. Rather, the Internet is a convenient pathway to
accomplish their goals. Thus, cyberthreats are likely to target
specific information or services on the Internet, rather than the
network itself, and there are moderating factors that would restrain at least some attackers.
A more restrained and realistic view of cyberthreats is
helpful to regulation. Available evidence on Internet damage
223. Siobhan Gorman et al., Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at A1.
224. Linda McGlasson, NY Town‘s Bank Account Hacked, BANK INFO SECURITY (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=2182.
225. Shadows in the Cloud, supra note 62.
226. Broad et al., supra note 2.
227. Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege
in Estonia, N.Y. TIMES ( May 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/
technology/29estonia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
228. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 26–27.
229. Id. at 28.
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strongly suggests that rushing to regulate is unnecessary, and
potentially harmful. The Internet‘s fundamental design treats
managing network disruptions, including from attacks, as a
core goal. Cyberattacks would likely produce effects similar to
other large-scale network problems, such as from natural disasters—they would slow traffic and increase costs, but routing
would continue. In short, cyberspace is not falling, and overheated descriptions of cyberapocalypse obscure cybersecurity‘s
true challenges. Policymakers have sufficient time to craft
thoughtful solutions. Code is on their side. The next Section describes the approach that should guide their efforts.
III. TED STEVENS WAS RIGHT: CYBERSECURITY AS
INFORMATION PROBLEM
Cybersecurity is, in truth, a problem of information. In this
regard, Senator Ted Stevens was, ironically, correct: the Internet is a series of tubes.230 Cybersecurity should concentrate on
what flows through the tubes as its primary concern, rather
than the tubes themselves. Indeed, such an orientation comports with the development principles of the Internet itself—
the network is designed to be indifferent to the underlying connectivity that moves data from point to point. Users are unconcerned with how packets move across the Internet. They care
only about their ability to send and receive them at the network‘s edge. This Article proposes that cybersecurity should
concentrate on information, as evidenced by users‘ goals.
A. INFORMATION LAW‘S HERITAGE
Focusing on information as the key tenet for regulation has
a strong theoretical lineage, though it is relatively new to legal
academia. Mary Graham has written on the use of information,
and mandates for its provision, as a means of regulating problems from pollution to obesity.231 Laws governing equity markets dictate the disclosure, and retention, of information about
publicly traded corporations.232 Trade secret statutes protect
economically valuable private information to generate incen230. Senator Stevens‘ infamous quote is from a speech on network neutrality on June 28, 2006. Series of Tubes, YOUTUBE (June 28, 2006), http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=f99PcP0aFNE. The complete audio recording is available online, as well. Alex Curtis, Senator Stevens Speaks on Net Neutrality,
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (June 28, 2006), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/497.
231. See generally MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE (2002).
232. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-06, 249.308 (2011).
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tives for its production and use.233 Scholarly debates about
network neutrality concentrate not on the network‘s structure,
but on how that structure affects the creation of information.
Organizing research around information has revolutionized
fields from behavioral biology,234 to mathematics,235 to economics.236 An information-focused approach helped biologists explain why male peacocks developed ornate tails that make
them easier targets for predators;237 why rich single men publicly donate considerable sums to charity;238 why spiders build
decorations into their webs;239 and why birds call loudly when
doing so attracts the attention of raptors.240 It explains why
people spend so much free time on social networking sites.241
Similarly, economics is increasingly dominated by the
study of information;242 indeed, in 2001, the Nobel Prize for the
field was awarded to three economists who pioneered the study

233. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 260–83 (1998); David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64
(1991).
234. See, e.g., Thomas A. Sebeok, A Communication Network Model for
Languages is Applied to Signaling Behavior in Animals, 147 SCI. 1006 (1965);
Maynard J. Smith & D.G.C. Harper, Animal Signals: Models and Terminology, 177 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY. 305 (1995).
235. See, e.g., C. E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication,
27 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 379 (1948) (extending the general theory of communication to include ―the savings possible‖ by looking in part to the ―statistical structure‖ of the information communicated).
236. See, e.g., Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355
(1973) (using market information to develop conceptual framework in
economics).
237. See, e.g., Amotz Zahavi, Mate Selection—A Selection for a Handicap,
53 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 205, 210–11 (1975).
238. See, e.g., Vladas Griskevicius et al., Blatant Benevolence and Conspicuous Consumption: When Romantic Motives Elicit Strategic Costly Signals, 93
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 85, 85–86 (2007).
239. See, e.g., Ren-Chung Cheng & I-Min Tso, Signaling by Decorating
Webs: Luring Prey or Deterring Predators?, 18 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 1085, 1085
(2007).
240. See, e.g., Carl T. Bergstrom & Michael Lachmann, Alarm Calls as
Costly Signals of Antipredator Vigilance: The Watchful Babbler Game, 61 ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 535, 535–36 (2001).
241. See, e.g., Judith Donath, Signals in Social Supernets, 13 J. COMPUTERMEDIATED COMM. 231, 231 (2008).
242. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 460–61 (2002).
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of asymmetric information in markets.243 Behavior by market
participants is increasingly explained by analyzing its informational content, from firms that offer product warranties,244 to
the difficulties of selling a used car,245 to corporate decisions to
offer shareholders a dividend.246 Information economics explains why it is hard to sell an unsolicited script to a Hollywood
movie studio,247 or data on a bug to a software vendor.248 Even
wedding receptions play an informational role in social markets.249 Economists have acknowledged information‘s power to
shape markets—and vice versa—at least since F.A. Hayek‘s
work on prices as aggregators of private data.250 Increasingly,
though, economic scholarship is oriented towards information
as a principal focus.251

243. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel 2001, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (2001), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economics/laureates/2001/.
244. See generally William Boulding & Amna Kirmani, A Consumer-Side
Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?, 20 J. CONSUMER RES. 111 (1993) (discussing
signaling theory in the context of product warranty offerings).
245. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for ―Lemons‖: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing
how individuals use information in purchase decisions).
246. See generally Aharon R. Ofer & Daniel R. Siegel, Corporate Financial
Policy, Information, and Market Expectations: An Empirical Investigation of
Dividends, 42 J. FIN. 889 (1987) (discussing whether changes in corporate financial policy convey information about performance to the markets).
247. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
1293, 1366–68 (1996); Catherine L. Fisk, Screen Credit and the Writers Guild
of America, 1938–2000: A Study in Labor Market and Idea Market Intermediation 3 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_
dlv1/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__engelberg_center_on_innovation_law_and_
policy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_067662.pdf (discussing how credit for
writing ―establishes careers‖ and ―affects how studios evaluate ideas‖).
248. Bambauer & Day, supra note 62, at 1063–65. See generally Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962).
249. Francis Bloch el al., Wedding Celebrations as Conspicuous Consumption: Signaling Social Status in Rural India, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 675, 676
(2004).
250. See generally F. A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 89–105 (W. W. Bartley III ed., paperback ed. 1991) (discussing how
trade and commerce depend in part on individual or special information).
251. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1441 (2000) (explaining how information economics has changed the way we think).
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Mathematics, too, has shifted towards an informationcentric approach, especially with game theory. This move began
with the work of John von Neumann on games with both perfect252 and imperfect253 information, which he later applied to
nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.254 Mathematicians
such as John Nash,255 Norbert Wiener,256 and Lloyd Shapley257
refined and extended game theory. Game theory revolves
around information: one‘s strategy is altered by what one
knows about everyone else‘s strategies.258 The mathematics of
information have revolutionized approaches to problems as diverse as authenticating digital data,259 voting manipulation,260
dealing with rogue states,261 and auctions of spectrum rights.262
The key insight of game theory is that analysis must begin with
assessing information, and in particular what information is
accessible in a given system.263
252. J.v. Neumann, Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele [On Game Theory],
100 MATHEMATISCHE ANNALEN 295 (1928) (Ger.).
253. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY
OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953) (discussing the theory of
games with both perfect and imperfect information).
254. See, e.g., FLO CONWAY & JIM SIEGELMAN, DARK HERO OF THE INFORMATION AGE 252 (2005).
255. See generally John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951) (applying game theory to poker).
256. See generally NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS OR CONTROL AND
COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (1948) (explaining how
information is used to provide effective control).
257. See generally L.S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, in II CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES 307 (H.W. Kuhn & A.W. Tucker eds.,
1953) (applying game theory to abstract games).
258. See JÜRGEN EICHBERGER, GAME THEORY FOR ECONOMISTS 16–17
(1993) (discussing the ways in which one‘s strategy is affected by his or her
opponent).
259. See generally Gustavus J. Simmons, A Game Theory Model of Digital
Message Authentication, 34 CONGRESSUS NUMERANTIUM 413 (1982) (using
mathematical models to describe participant objectives in authentication
games).
260. See generally ALAN D. TAYLOR, SOCIAL CHOICE AND THE MATHEMATICS OF MANIPULATION (2005) (presenting theorems of mathematical naturality
that deal with the manipulability of voting systems).
261. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
(1960) (applying game theory to international conflicts).
262. PATRICK BAJARI & JEREMY T. FOX, MEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF AN
FCC SPECTRUM AUCTION 31 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
seminardocs/bajarifox_auction.pdf.
263. See EICHBERGER, supra note 258 (discussing analysis of behavior in
games of chess and penny matching and stating that ―if optimal behavior of a
player depends on the opponent‘s action, then the player needs to know what
this opponent knows about the game and her behavior‖).
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This Article draws upon information-based models in other
scholarly fields to formulate a new theory of cybersecurity. The
first critical, and difficult, step for this theory is to define what
constitutes ―information.‖ At one level, every piece of data on
the Internet, from Border Gateway Protocol messages to spam
messages, constitutes information. However, this is not helpful:
some of this data is already protected by wide distribution (for
example, DNS information is frequently cached by servers),264
and some of it does not require protection (for example, stateless protocols such as HTTP do not need to track requests, as
they can be retransmitted).265 This Article proposes a purposive
definition of information: Internet data counts as information
when it is something that users seek to access or engage with.
A broker seeking the latest financial news from the Wall Street
Journal is indifferent to the IP address of the Journal‘s website, and a bibliophile who wants to order Cormac McCarthy‘s
Blood Meridian does not care whether Barnes and Noble is
available at bn.com versus barnesandnoble.com. They care
about accessing market news, or ordering the book. Information
is the goal; data that route information to users are best understood as infrastructure. Information thus encompasses meta-data as well: it matters significantly to a user if an e-mail
regarding her credit card bill resides in the ―Paid‖ or ―Unpaid‖
folder of her e-mail file. As we will see, information should be
stored inefficiently; infrastructure need not be inefficient.
One can analogize the purposive definition of information
to the distinction made in Fourth Amendment and privacy doctrine between routing data and content data: the words spoken
during a phone call are content, while the number dialed is
routing data.266 The content/routing approach operates with a
similar orientation to the new cybersecurity theory, as the distinction depends on whether the communicating party evinces
a reasonable expectation of privacy in that signal.267 Thus, it
too focuses on user expectations. However, the distinction between routing data and content has, rightly, been criticized as
collapsing at points.268 There is both semantic and practical
264. DOUGLAS E. COMER, COMPUTER NETWORKS AND INTERNETS 74 –75
(5th ed. 2009).
265. LEON SHKLAR & RICHARD ROSEN, WEB APPLICATION ARCHITECTURE
34 (2003).
266. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (content), with
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (routing data).
267. Katz, 389 UnitedStates at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
268. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
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content value to learning a sender‘s e-mail address, even
though that address is treated as routing data in constitutional269 and statutory270 privacy analyses. The e-mail address
might well count as information, not infrastructure. Hence, the
content/routing categories do not map perfectly; some material
classified as routing data for privacy purposes could constitute
information for cybersecurity purposes.
A simple test for the distinction between information and
infrastructure is to consider how one would implement redundancy (as proposed in Part IV). Take, for example, the website
for the White House. The site contains pages on President Obama‘s cabinet members, press briefings, policy issues, and presidential pets.271 Its domain name is www.whitehouse.gov. Former cybersecurity czar Richard Clarke arranged for the White
House site to be mirrored on Akamai‘s content caching servers
to increase its redundancy, and hence security.272 Thus, a user
seeking a photo of President Obama‘s dog Bo on the White
House site might in fact be connected to an Akamai server. The
user is unconcerned about whether whitehouse.gov resolves to
whitehouse.gov.edgesuite.net (an Akamai domain), but is (perhaps sadly) quite concerned about whether he can reach the
picture of Bo at that address. Information is the material that a
user expects to find, to view, or to make use of, regardless of
where it is located. The domain name, IP address, server identity and physical location of the White House website may
change, and are infrastructure. The photo of Bo is information.
This conceptually clean distinction may prove complicated
in individual cases. One can argue whether a sender‘s e-mail
address should be classified as information or as infrastructure,

WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1287–88 (2004). But see Orin S. Kerr, A User‘s Guide to
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator‘s Guide to Amending It, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1228 n.142 (2004).
269. See, e.g., U.S. v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
270. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006).
271. See Issues, THE WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues ( last
visited Nov. 7, 2011); Presidential Pets, THE WHITEHOUSE, http://www
.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/photogallery/presidential-pets ( last visited
Nov. 7, 2011); Press Briefings, THE WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse
.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011); The Cabinet, THE
WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet ( last visited
Nov. 7, 2011).
272. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 24, 112. A DNS query performed
on February 19, 2011, indicates that www.whitehouse.gov is still hosted by
Akamai, as the canonical name contains Akamai‘s edgesuite.net.
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particularly given that such addresses are readily faked.273
However, focusing on this question—whether given data counts
as information—is precisely the point of this Article‘s approach.
It evaluates cybersecurity by seeking to determine what content users want to engage with, rather than how it reaches
them, or why. An information-oriented approach employing a
purposive definition usefully re-orients cybersecurity towards
users‘ needs.
Organizing cybersecurity around information has additional advantages. It provides a theoretical basis for developing
responses, and for measuring their efficacy. Cybersecurity improves when authorized users can access the information they
seek, and when unauthorized ones cannot. The information
framework for cybersecurity is a functionalist one: it posits a
set of goals or ends, and then measures possible responses
based on how they achieve those ends.274 At base, it is consequentialist, concerned more with outcomes than with the paths
taken to reach them.275 Moreover, the information-based approach comports with the underlying interests of Internet users, and sets aside more parochial concerns such as allocation
of responsibility for enforcement, choice of regulatory methodology, or identification of malefactors.
Also, this theory avoids (or takes in passing) the welter of
complications that ensues from standard scholarly approaches
that try to sort behavior into the traditional categories of war,
crime, terror and espionage based on an actor‘s identity and intent.276 Consider, for example, a denial of service attack on a
stock exchange‘s website.277 The attack could be motivated by
a desire to extort payments from the target (crime), by a nation-state seeking to interfere with key infrastructure (war), or
by a violent non-state group making a political statement (ter-

273. See Bambauer, supra note 90, ¶¶ 14 –15 (explaining how spam works
based on trust between email domains).
274. On functionalism, see generally Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2067–70 (2009) and Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1238–69 (1999).
275. Information law can also be grounded in process-based deontological
approaches. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377
(2009).
276. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 17, at 404 (discussing complications in
the threat dichotomy that arises from untraditional attacks in cyberspace).
277. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Hackers Penetrate NASDAQ Computers,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2011, at A1.

628

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:584

ror).278 Hackers are skilled in concealing their tracks, and the
Internet‘s architecture aids them in evading attribution. This
deficit in identifying data stymies traditional scholarly models,
which are left to call for better initial security (thereby wishing
away the problem), and for alterations to the Internet that enhance attribution. Yet, while determining intent may help allocate responsibility for a response, it is ultimately irrelevant to
the problem, which is that users cannot access information
about their stocks on the exchange‘s site.279 The informationbased approach is both conceptually more precise, and more
closely aligned to the purposes for which people access the Internet.
Next, this Article proposes three core concerns for its information-based theory of cybersecurity: access, alteration, and
integrity.
B. ACCESS
Access to information measures whether users can obtain
desired data via the Internet. Access can be conceived as a continuum with both a positive and negative range. In the positive
direction, cybersecurity seeks to ensure that those who are authorized or intended to consume information are able to do so.
In the negative direction, cybersecurity tries to prevent those
who are not authorized to access data from doing so. Distributing information across multiple computers, for example, reduces the likelihood that an attacker can completely prevent access
to that data.280 Thus, the e-commerce firm Amazon thwarted
the hacktivist group Anonymous by making use of the company‘s EC2 cloud computing service.281 Anonymous was unable to
overwhelm Amazon‘s legion of Web servers; consumers were
still able to reach the site282 and the hackers later publicly ad-

278. See id. (discussing that there are multiple motivations for hacking into
the exchanges network).
279. See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, Russia‘s Stock Market Knocked Offline By DoS
Attack, INFO. W. (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.informationweek.com/news/
security/government/ 178601897.
280. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 24, 112.
281. Paul McDougall, Amazon Cloud Withstands WikiLeaks Attack, INFO.
W. (Dec. 9, 2010, 4:31 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/
attacks/ 228800075.
282. Julianne Pepitone, Why Attackers Can‘t Take Down Amazon.com,
CNNMONEY (Dec. 9, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/09/
technology/amazon_wikileaks_attack/index.htm.
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mitted defeat.283 Amazon‘s efforts demonstrate one effective
means of addressing the positive aspect of access: overprovisioning ensured that those who wished to reach the site‘s information could do so.284
The negative aspect of access, though, is different: Amazon
did not seek to prevent Anonymous from reaching its online
store, but merely from blockading it. Cybersecurity also implicates access‘s negative range—on preventing undesired access
to data. During the 2004 American presidential campaign, for
example, the campaign website of President George W. Bush
rejected access attempts from computers with non-U.S. IP addresses.285 The Bush reelection campaign sought to limit access
to the site‘s information to its target users: American voters.
This concern is conceptually different from the positive aspect
of access. It requires differentiating among requests for data,
either by using proxies for permission (such as the user‘s IP
address)286 or directly by issuing credentials (such as name and
password combinations, or cryptographic keys).287 Blocking
access can also be a blanket prohibition, such as when countries engage in statewide filtering of information.288 China, for
example, blocks all users on its network from accessing sites
such as the official home page of the government of Taiwan, or
that of the activist group Human Rights in China.289 Thus, positive access requires ensuring that the right users can reach
data, while negative access requires keeping the wrong users
away from it.
283. Id.
284. Amazon‘s strategy is also effective in increasing the positive alteration
aspect of cybersecurity, as discussed infra Part III.C.
285. Geolocation filtering: www.georgewbush.com Blocked During Run-up
to Election, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Oct. 27, 2004), http://opennet.net/bulletins/007/.
286. See, e.g., UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. & Yahoo! France, Tribunal de
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20,
2000 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120
.pdf (translation available at http://www.lapres.net/yahen.html) (noting that
Yahoo! could block French users from accessing prohibited hate speech content
based on IP address).
287. See, e.g., David W. Chadwick & Alexander Otenko, Implementing Role
Based Access Controls Using X.509 Privilege Management—the PERMIS Authorisation Infrastructure, in SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN ADVANCED NETWORKING TECHNOLOGIES 26, 38 (Borka Jerman-Blazic et al. eds., 2004) (showing
how PERMIS provides an authorization engine which determines which users
are allowed to perform which actions).
288. See generally Bambauer, supra note 275 (discussing internet censorship).
289. ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 95, at 21.
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C. ALTERATION
Alteration similarly has positive and negative aspects. Alteration is separate from access, as one may access information
without being able to alter it, and vice-versa. A user can read
stock price updates from the New York Stock Exchange without
having the capability to alter that information. Similarly, a citizen who engages in electronic voting has the power to alter the
underlying information (the total votes cast, as well as the
number cast for a particular candidate) without having the capacity to access it.290 I can send you an e-mail message, thereby
changing your Inbox, without being able to access your Inbox.
The positive range of alteration seeks to ensure that authorized
users can change information. Facebook, for example, was unavailable to people attempting to post status updates, or to indicate how much they ―like‖ a Web page, for nearly three hours
in September 2010—an example of trivial importance, but one
of wide incidence, as the social network boasts over 500 million
users.291 Less trivially, the ability to alter information is at the
root of electronic commerce, messaging, and financial data exchange. Positive alteration concerns include ensuring that the
data to be updated is available, and that authorized users can
make changes to it.
Cybersecurity‘s negative range for alteration focuses on
preventing changes to information by unauthorized users. This
could involve preventing the wholesale deletion of data, such as
occurred when U.K. Internet Service Provider VAServ lost the
contents of over 100,000 hosted sites due to hacking in June
2009.292 The hackers gained root access on the system, allowing
them to delete files; the loss was particularly problematic for
customers subscribing to VAServ‘s lower-cost unmanaged service, where data was not backed up systematically.293 One
might also view Amazon‘s deletion of the George Orwell novel
1984 from its customers‘ Kindle e-book readers as unauthorized
alteration (although Amazon claimed refuge in boilerplate au290. See generally Ronald L. Rivest, Electronic Voting, MASS. INST. TECH.
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-ElectronicVoting.pdf ( last visited Nov.
7, 2011).
291. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, What Caused Facebook‘s Worst Outage in
Four Years, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
digits/2010/09/24/what-caused-facebooks-worst-outage-in-four-years.
292. Dan Goodin, Webhost Hack Wipes Out Data for 100,000 Sites, THE
REG. (June 8, 2009, 8:02 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/06/08/webhost_
attack/.
293. Id.
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thorization language in the Kindle terms of service agreement).294 Unauthorized alteration could also come in the form
of changes to information, rather than its complete erasure. For
example, the hacker group Iranian Cyber Army left virtual
graffiti on the home page of China‘s Baidu search engine in
January 2010, replacing its usual appearance with an image of
Iran‘s flag.295 The Stuxnet cyberweapon replaced actual centrifuge data with faked information indicating the machines were
operating normally, lulling Iran‘s nuclear engineers into a false
sense of security.296 While it is easy to recognize when a website has been defaced, unauthorized alteration of information
could be more subtle, and difficult to detect, as Stuxnet
demonstrates.
Lastly, the information-based theory raises a second-order
concern: data integrity. This issue arises after a user seeks either to access or alter information. The concern is whether the
user is interacting with valid, up-to-date information. In distributed computing systems, such as where websites are cached
to improve access speeds, either users must accept that data
will be stale (though perhaps only slightly so), or systems must
devise ways to rapidly propagate changes to each copy of the
information.297 Thus, when most users load CNN.com in their
Web browser, the page returned comes not directly from CNN‘s
servers, but instead from a copy cached by Akamai.298 Users,
and CNN itself, trade accuracy for speed. For some purposes,
though, such as financial transactions, using real-time data is
critical. Financial companies build expensive high-speed networks to ensure that information is up-to-date.299 The London
294. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2009, at B1; Mark Hachman, Amazon‘s Bezos Apologizes for ‗1984‘
Kindle Boondoggle, PCMAG.COM (July 24, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://appscout
.pcmag.com/mobile-apps/272034 -amazon-s-bezos-apologizes-for-1984 kindleboondoggle#fbid=UEnYsvQkesW.
295. Melanie Lee, China‘s Baidu Website Defaced by Twitter Hackers, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/12/
china-hacking-idUSTOE60B05U20100112.
296. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Geoff Huston, Web Caching, 2 INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 2
(1999), available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/
ipj_2-3/ipj_2-7.pdf.
298. See, e.g., Press Release, CNN.com Teams with Akamai to Deliver
Record Traffic on Election Day, (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.akamai
.com/html/about/press/releases/2004/press_111004.html.
299. Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A1.
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Stock Exchange replaced its matching engine because the software experienced delays of up to 2 milliseconds; the new Linuxbased engine operates with an average latency of only 125 microseconds.300 High-frequency trading executes orders in a few
hundred microseconds—these trades occur so rapidly that the
physical location of the server executing them affects their timing.301 Similarly, cybersecurity must consider how to signal to
users whether a given piece of information reflects the most recent set of authorized changes.
Integrity also requires providing a method to determine
whether information, including up-to-date information, is valid—whether it encompasses only authorized changes. The
Stuxnet worm exemplifies this concern: it caused Iran‘s centrifuges to relay inaccurate information, concealing the weapon‘s
effects on the uranium enrichment process.302 Author Tom L.
Clancy offered another example, before the Internet was in
widespread use, in his 1995 novel Debt of Honor. In the book,
operatives covertly falsify data on the New York Stock Exchange trading system during a conflict between Japan and the
U.S., leading to a financial panic. Traders are unable to determine what information is valid, leading to economic chaos.303
To prevent similar real-world problems, the information-based
approach posits that cybersecurity must incorporate mechanisms to determine whether a given datum‘s state reflects only
authorized changes.
D. INTEGRITY
Finally, information integrity must grapple with changes
in distributed data stores. When information resides in multiple locations, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that authorized users will make changes to different copies at the same

300. Leo King, London Stock Exchange Price Data Failures ‗Emerged Immediately at Millennium Launch‘, COMPUTERWORLD UK (Feb. 18, 2011, 5:40
PM), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-business/3261816/london-stock
-exchange-price-data-failures-emerged-immediately-at-millennium-launch.
301. Jacob Aron, High-Speed Trading Algorithms Place Markets at Risk,
NEW SCIENTIST (July 8, 2011, 3:39 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/
onepercent/2011/07/high-speed-trading-algorithms.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=
online-news.
302. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
303. Clarke and Knake contemplate a similar scenario and recommend
Clancy‘s solution: rolling back data to the last known valid state. CLARKE &
KNAKE, supra note 23, at 204.
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time.304 Distributed database systems such as Lotus Notes
must incorporate mechanisms for resolving these disparities
during updates.305 At minimum, systems must be capable of
choosing which copy counts as the most up-to-date valid instantiation of the data. Optimally, an information-based approach
would provide means for reconciling conflicting changes, and of
tracking the history of alterations to each copy.306
Fortunately, the computer science literature offers numerous techniques to accomplish these functions. For example,
cryptographic hash functions enable the use of manipulation
detection codes, whereby one can detect alteration to a given
data set.307 Voting-based methods compare multiple instances
of a data set; the version with the greatest number of instantiations is treated as correct.308 To understand voting, imagine
three instances of a CNN.com headline. Two read ―Truman Defeats Dewey‖; one reads ―Dewey Defeats Truman.‖ The first
version, where Truman wins, has more ―votes‖ and thus counts
as the correct version. Similarly, message digest functions can
validate integrity even in challenging technical environments
such as peer-to-peer media streaming.309 In addition, programs
such as BitTorrent,310 Lotus Notes,311 mySQL,312 and Oracle
304. Formally, these would be different updates even if the underlying data
change made by each user were the same (such as altering a bit from a value
of 1 to 0), as each change has a different provenance.
305. See Replication and Save Conflicts, IBM, http://publib.boulder.ibm
.com/infocenter/domhelp/v8r0/index.jsp?topic=/com.ibm.help.domino.admin.doc
/DOC/H_ABOUT_REPLICATION_AND_SAVE_CONFLICTS.html ( last updated Oct. 5, 2009) (providing directions on reducing replication or save
conflicts).
306. Id.; see also Todd L. Graves et al., Predicting Fault Incidence Using
Software Change History, 26 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 653 (2000) (using statistical models to evaluate which characteristics lead
to a large number of faults).
307. See ALFRED J. MENEZES ET AL., HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 321–67 (1997).
308. See, e.g., Johannes Osrael et al., Adaptive Voting for Balancing Data
Integrity with Availability, in ON THE MOVE TO MEANINGFUL INTERNET SYSTEMS 2006: OTM 2006 WORKSHOPS 1510, 1510–18 (Robert Meersman et al.
eds., 2006) (discussing replication of data for maintaining system availability
and various voting methods employed to determine the correct data set).
309. Ahsan Habib et al., Verifying Data Integrity in Peer-to-Peer Media
Streaming, in MULTIMEDIA COMPUTING AND NETWORKING 11 (Surendar
Chandra et al. eds., 2005).
310. BitTorrent uses a cryptographic hash to allow nodes to detect whether
a piece of a requested file has been modified. See Andrew Loewenstern, DHT
Protocol, BITTORRENT.ORG, http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0005.html (last
updated Feb. 28, 2008).
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Fusion313 implement such techniques. Thus, there is a body of
both theoretical methods and software implementation examples for cybersecurity to draw upon in dealing with information
integrity.
E. REORGANIZING CYBERSECURITY
This new theory, with its focus on accessing, altering, and
verifying the integrity of information, usefully illuminates the
flaws in current scholarly approaches that concentrate on identity and intent. As the following table makes clear, traditional
methodologies classify the same actions, and effects on information, differently depending on who carries them out, and for
what purpose. This may be helpful for second-order reasons,
such as whether a response to an attack falls within the purview of military or civilian authorities. However, it reifies these
concerns at the expense of core issues of cybersecurity. When
users are prevented from reaching critical information, they are
less concerned with the identity and goals of those responsible
than with having access restored. Similarly, if someone makes
unauthorized changes to information, those who want to use it
will be more focused on restoring that data to its last known valid state than on parsing why it was altered. Information wants
to be used. The information-based approach to cybersecurity
concentrates on those uses.
Information-Based Theory

Identity/Intent-Based Theories

Positive Access
(ensure authorized access)

Crime (ransomware)
Terrorism (denial of service)
War (denial of service)

Negative Access
( prevent unauthorized access)

Espionage
(data theft/intelligence gathering)
Crime (IP theft)

Positive Alteration
(ensure authorized changes)

Crime
(distributed denial of service)
Terrorism (denial of service)
War (denial of service)

311. Replication and Save Conflicts, supra note 305 (providing directions
on consolidating replication or save conflicts).
312. Robin Schumacher, Guaranteeing Data Integrity with MySQL 5.0,
MYSQL, http://kambing.ui.ac.id/mysql/tech-resources/articles/mysql-data-integrity
.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
313. Solving Common Replication Conflicts, ORACLE, http://download.oracle
.com/docs/cd/E20295_01/html/821-1220/bcasp.html ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
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Crime (hacking/data deletion)
Terrorism
(hacking/data deletion)
War (hacking/data deletion)

The information-based approach to cybersecurity also
strongly suggests that there are tradeoffs among security goals.
Specifically, regulators are likely to be forced to choose between
emphasizing the positive aspects of alteration and access, and
the negative aspects. Creating more ways for users to reach
and interact with information will, of necessity, generate more
pathways for malfeasors to reach that information as well. This
Article focuses upon a conceptual approach to improving the
positive aspects of cybersecurity through inefficiency. Future
work will address cybersecurity‘s negative aspects. The next
Part describes why, ironically, inefficient data storage and connectivity is useful for positive access and alteration, and then
turns to the inevitable tradeoffs that this approach entails.
IV. INEFFICIENCY‘S VIRTUES
For cybersecurity‘s positive aspects, inefficiency reigns.
This is counterintuitive. Efficiency is nearly the Holy Grail of
computer science, from increasing the speed of search algorithms314 to improving the storage of data on disk.315 Companies spend considerable sums to gain tiny improvements in efficiency.316 Financial firms invested hundreds of millions of
dollars317 in computers, low-latency network connections, and
proprietary algorithms318 to increase the speed of trades by a
few milliseconds. The payoff is estimated to be $21 billion an-

314. See generally STEPHEN WISE, GIS BASICS 76–84 (2002) (describing algorithm efficiency).
315. See, e.g., P. Chicoine et al., Hard Disk Drive Long Data Sector White
Paper, IDEMA, 8–9 (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.idema.gr.jp/technical/white/6_
13_07.pdf (describing efficiency gains from conversion to Advanced Format
disk storage format).
316. Duhigg, supra note 299 (describing how stock traders invest money to
gain improvements in efficiency).
317. Rick Bookstaber, The Arms Race in High Frequency Trading, RICK
BOOKSTABER (Apr. 21, 2009), http://rick.bookstaber.com/2009/04/arms-race-in
-high-frequency-trading.html.
318. See, e.g., Jack Lynch, Programmer Indicted in Goldman Code Theft
Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Feb 11, 2010, 4:49 PM), http://dealbook
.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/programmer-indicted-in-goldman-code-theft-case
(discussing theft of proprietary software and its seriousness).
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nually.319 Efficiency determines adoption of technological standards. Apple refuses to support the near-ubiquitous Flash video
format on its mobile products,320 due primarily to efficiency
concerns. Former chief executive Steve Jobs called Flash a
―CPU hog,‖321 and his official statement noted the company‘s
conclusion that ―[f]lash has not performed well on mobile devices.‖322 Similarly, concerns over compression efficiency of
competing video codecs blocked adoption of one codec as a standard in HTML5.323 In short, seeking to increase efficiency in
computing is the norm, and a proposal to deliberately cultivate
inefficiency is admittedly unusual.
Moreover, this pro-efficiency bias is particularly true for
the Internet. The Internet‘s core design frequently sacrifices
countervailing considerations in favor of efficiency. For example, Internet Protocol does not perform error-checking when
routing data packets.324 Any packets that go missing must be
re-transmitted. This ―best efforts‖ model forgoes delivery guarantees to optimize IP for efficient data transfer.325 Internet protocols sometimes must select for efficiency in certain tasks at
the expense of others. For example, the Domain Name System
(DNS) uses a distributed database to map domain names to IP
addresses.326 This mapping improves the efficiency of responding to requests since there are more DNS servers to share the
load, some of which will be ―closer‖ on the network to the requester.327 However, the distributed database detracts from the
efficiency of propagating changes. When IBM changes the IP
address for the Web server that hosts www.ibm.com, that
319. Rob Iati, The Real Story of Trading Software Espionage, ADVANCED
TRADING (July 10, 2009), http://advancedtrading.com/algorithms/ 218401501.
320. Stephen Shankland, Jobs: Why Apple Banned Flash from the iPhone,
CNET NEWS (Apr. 29, 2010, 6:56 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3
-20003739-264.html.
321. Erica Ogg, Report: Jobs Disses Adobe Flash as ―CPU Hog‖, CNET
NEWS (Feb 18, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31021_3-10456175
-260.html.
322. Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Flash, APPLE (Apr. 2010), http://www.apple
.com/hotnews/thoughts-on-flash.
323. Ryan Paul, Decoding the HTML5 Video Codec Debate, ARS TECHNICA
(July 5, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/open-source/news/2009/07/decoding-the
-html-5-video-codec-debate.ars.
324. INFO. SCIS. INSTIT., RFC 791: INTERNET PROTOCOL 2 (Jon Postel ed.,
Sept. 1981), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc791.txt.
325. See, e.g., CHARLES M. KOZIEROK, THE TCP/IP GUIDE 690 (2005).
326. CRICKET LIU & PAUL ALBITZ, DNS AND BIND 3–10 (2006).
327. See KOZIEROK, supra note 325, at 849 (explaining that this distribution of data leads to efficiency and reliability).
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change must be updated in the caches of many DNS servers,
whereas employing a single, centralized database would ensure
an instantaneous update.328 While trade-offs between goals are
inevitable, the underlying principle of maximizing efficiency is
widely implemented.
Yet cybersecurity is different. Maximizing users‘ ability to
access and alter information is best achieved through inefficient storage and inefficient network connections. Having information located in multiple places makes it more costly to
maintain. However, it is also more resilient. A single information repository efficiently scales to serve many users, and updates must only be made once. But if attackers discover a vulnerability, such as a zero-day attack that affects the monolith,
all may be lost.329
Similarly, having a single high-speed network can be highly efficient, until a glitch or attack knocks it offline. Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center in Boston had a state-of-the-art
network built by Cisco Networks to connect its doctors to medical data such as electronic health records.330 Yet, when a researcher‘s program flooded the network, the hospital‘s data
access was cut off.331 For the next four days, staff wrote orders
on paper and delivered them by hand while technicians worked
feverishly.332 Having a single point of failure in its computing
infrastructure forced the hospital to shift information normally
carried by 100,000 daily e-mails onto paper.333 In the aftermath, Beth Israel Deaconess spent $3 million on upgrading its
technology—specifically, building a second, parallel network.334
328. Cf. NAT‘L RES. COUNCIL, SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE: THE DOMAIN
NAME SYSTEM AND INTERNET NAVIGATION 43 (2005) (showing how ―the work
of registering changes [in a DNS model] is distributed among many organization,‖ and therefore, could inherently not be instantaneous (although it may be
less burdensome to each individual organization)).
329. See, e.g., Goodin, supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing
the destruction of 100,000 websites as a result of a zero-day vulnerability in a
widely used virtualization application).
330. Anne Barnard, Got Paper? Beth Israel Deaconess Copes with a Massive
Computer Crash, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2002, at C1; see also Peter Kilbridge,
Computer Crash–Lessons from a System Failure, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 881,
881 (2003) (explaining the variety of network applications available to doctors
and patients).
331. Barnard, supra note 330 (describing the crisis faced by the medical
center when its system froze).
332. Michele Kurtz, His Goal: Computerized Patient Records, BOS. GLOBE,
Aug. 24, 2004, at C2.
333. Barnard, supra note 330.
334. Id.
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The network failure was caused initially by bad code—
described in news reports as a ―virus,‖ though a self-inflicted
one—but in a larger sense was caused by the hospital‘s decision
to opt for efficiency over redundancy.335
Inefficiency creates resiliency. Data stored in many places
gives users more locations to access and alter it. Providing
many paths to reach that information improves users‘ chances
of doing so. It can also serve to deter attacks by muting their
effects. There is little benefit to launching a fruitless attack.
Thus, inefficiency improves the positive aspects of cybersecurity. The next two sections of this Article describe how to implement inefficiency for information and for connectivity.
A. SCATTERING THE BITS
WikiLeaks survives.
Like the hydra, each time an attack cuts off one of WikiLeaks‘s heads, another sprouts. In 2008, a federal judge ordered WikiLeaks‘s domain name registrar to sever the site‘s
link to its wikileaks.org domain name.336 Users who entered
wikileaks.org into their browser would not reach Julian Assange‘s repository. Undaunted, the site shifted to a new domain
name to evade the block, and the judge eventually surrendered
and dissolved the injunction.337 In late 2010, after posting a
massive batch of U.S. diplomatic cables and military documents, WikiLeaks was dropped as a customer of Amazon‘s
cloud computing service, forcing the site to find a new Web
host.338 Its DNS provider, under pressure from a denial of ser-

335. See Kurtz, supra note 332 (using ―virus‖ description to explain the
computer‘s network problem); see also E-mail from Richard M. Smith to Declan McCullagh (Dec. 3, 2002, 06:49), available at http://seclists.org/politech/
2002/Dec/4 (noting that ―the wounds however were self-inflicted‖).
336. Order Granting Permanent Injunction, Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, No. CV08-0824 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://docs.justia
.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2008cv00824/200125/48/. The
order banned Dynadot from translating requests for the wikileaks.org domain
name to the relevant IP address. Id.
337. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Dissolving Permanent Injunction; And Setting Briefing and Hearing Schedule, WikiLeaks, 535
F. Supp. 2d 980, 985–86 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
338. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Says WikiLeaks Violated Terms of
Service, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748703377504575651321402763304.html (explaining that WikiLeaks was
dropped for breaking Amazon‘s rules of service).
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vice attack, terminated WikiLeaks as a client.339 The payment
providers MasterCard and PayPal ceased processing payments
to WikiLeaks.340 A patriotic hacker launched a cyber attack
against WikiLeaks that knocked WikiLeaks offline for a
time.341 Yet, through all of these tribulations, WikiLeaks‘ trove
of information remained available, mirrored on thousands of
sites at a host of domain names.342 Users seeking information
about Australia‘s black list of filtered websites343 or the
Church of Scientology‘s financial status344 can access such material with ease. WikiLeaks accomplishes this remarkable persistence through inefficiency: the site‘s information is widely
duplicated, ensuring that no single attack can prevent access or
alteration (such as submitting new documents). WikiLeaks‘s information lives on multiple servers, including a server located
in a former nuclear bunker in Stockholm, Sweden,345 on the
Swedish Pirate Party‘s servers,346 and on the computers of
339. Charles Arthur & Josh Halliday, WikiLeaks Fights to Stay Online After US Company Withdraws Domain Name, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 3, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/blog/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-knocked-off-net-dns
-everydns.
340. See Declan McCullagh, MasterCard Pulls Plug on WikiLeaks Payments, CNET NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_
3-20024776-281.html (describing MasterCard‘s decision to stop accepting WikiLeaks payments); Alexia Tsotsis, PayPal VP on Blocking WikiLeaks: State
Department Said It Was Illegal, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 8, 2010), http://
techcrunch.com/2010/12/08/paypal-wikileaks/ (discussing PayPal‘s decision to
block WikiLeaks payments).
341. Richard Allen Greene & Nicola Hughes, ‗Hacktivist for Good‘ Claims
WikiLeaks Takedown, CNN (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/
29/wikileaks.hacker/index.html?hpt=T1.
342. See Brian Prince, WikiLeaks Hit with DoS Attack Before Documents
Leaked, EWEEK.COM (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/
WikiLeaks-Hit-With-DoS-Attack-Before-Documents-Leaked-680058/ (crediting
WikiLeaks‘s ability to avoid significant downtime to its decision to use three
IP addresses since its launch).
343. See Australian Government Secret ACMA Internet Censorship Blacklist,
18 Mar 2009, WIKILEAKS (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.wikileaks.info/wiki/
Australian_government_secret_ACMA_internet_censorship_blacklist,_18_Mar_
2009 (providing a list of the Australian Communication and Media Authority‘s
―internet censorship blacklist‖).
344. Scientology Cult Finance Documents Part 1, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Scientology_cult_finance_documents_part_1.
345. Andy Greenberg, WikiLeaks Servers Move to Underground Nuclear
Bunker, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2010), http://blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/
08/30/wikileaks-servers-move-to-underground-nuclear-bunker/?boxes=business
channeltopstories.
346. Swedish Pirate Party to Host WikiLeaks Servers, CNN (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/08/18/sweden.wikileaks/.
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OVH, a French web services company.347 Changes to WikiLeaks must propagate across these doppelgangers, but the inefficient nature of the site‘s storage increases its security. WikiLeaks arrived at this information architecture through hard
experience: the site has experienced cyberattacks,348 law enforcement pressure,349 and even threats of assassination
against Assange.350 WikiLeaks is a test case for increasing cybersecurity through information inefficiency. And the results
are clear: inefficiency works.
This Article‘s information-oriented theory posits that a key
goal for cybersecurity is increasing the inefficiency with which
information is stored. The positive aspects of both access to,
and alteration of data, emphasize the need to ensure that authorized users can reach, and modify, information. This is more
likely to occur when users can reach data at multiple locations,
both because it increases attackers‘ difficulty in blocking their
attempts, and because it provides fallback options if a given copy
is not available. In short, data should reside in many places.
This approach to implementing the information-oriented
theory of cybersecurity aligns with prior proposals and efforts.
Jonathan Zittrain suggests that there should not be single, monolithic Internet repositories of information.351 Instead, he proposes, Web hosts and other ISPs should adopt a communitarian
ethic of caching data as they relay it in response to user requests.352 Richard Clarke replicated the White House‘s web347. Associated Press, French Company Allowed to Keep Hosting WikiLeaks, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 8, 2010, 7:37 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
French-company-allowed-to-apf-1530963796.html?x=0.
348. See Greene & Hughes, supra note 341 (discussing a hacker who took
WikiLeaks‘s site down for political reasons).
349. See, e.g., Assange Attorney: Secret Grand Jury Meeting in Virginia on
WikiLeaks, CNN (Dec. 13, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-13/justice/
wikileaks.investigation_1_julian-assange-wikileaks-case-grand-jury?_s=PM:CRIME
(discussing a criminal investigation into WikiLeaks‘s publication of diplomatic
cables).
350. See Jeffrey T. Kuhner, Assassinate Assange?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/2/assassinate-assange/
(stating that ―Mr. Assange is not a journalist or publisher; rather, he is an
enemy combatant - and should be treated as such‖ and that ―[t]he administration must take care of the problem‖).
351. See Zittrain, supra note 105, at 2777–78 (arguing that eliminating
monopolistic repositories of information ―creates a useful friction in the system, while still preserving opportunity for removing material‖).
352. See id. at 2779–81 (explaining the benefits of such a system by saying
that ―[i]f one site later fails or is blocked, the user can request a copy of it from
the server that linked him there‖).
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site on Akamai‘s servers, allowing the site to remain available
even during a denial of service attack in July 2009.353 The BitTorrent peer-to-peer application spreads data across its network of nodes so that any one computer holds only a small
fragment of a particular file.354 Each BitTorrent host thus incurs a minimal burden when sharing files, and requests for a
given file do not depend on any single node‘s availability.355 For
e-mail, organizations often employ multiple servers corresponding to a single domain name to ensure that messages reach
their destination even if one computer fails.356
Most entities that store information deliberately make
their storage redundant; indeed, such efforts may be legally
mandated. Attorneys licensed to practice in New York, for example, must maintain certain bookkeeping records for seven
years after a client matter ends.357 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regulations dictate that accounting firms
keep records related to auditing and financial statement review
for seven years after such reviews are concluded.358 The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires that certain health information be retained for at least six years.359 The
Food and Drug Administration imposes requirements, under its
Good Manufacturing Standards, that certain medical device data be preserved for at least two years from the date the data is
released for commercial distribution.360 The Occupational
Health and Safety Act institutes a requirement that data on
employees‘ workplace exposure to hazardous or toxic substances be maintained for at least thirty years.361 These existing requirements suggest that private incentives for information storage are frequently inadequate, at least in comparison
to larger societal interests in that information. Moreover, cybersecurity regulation of information inefficiency can effectively
353. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 24.
354. See, e.g., MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER
REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD 113–15 (2007) (explaining BitTorret and
describing it as a ―file distribution tool‖).
355. For an argument that BitTorrent‘s file-sharing architecture is faster
and more efficient than traditional networking sites, see id. at 113.
356. This technique involves listing multiple mail exchange, or MX, records
for a given host name in the Domain Name System. See LIU & ALBITZ, supra
note 326, at 89–99 (explaining the effect of DNS on electronic mail).
357. N.Y. RULES OF PROF ‘L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d) (2009).
358. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-06 (2011).
359. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530( j)(2) (2010).
360. 21 C.F.R. § 820.180(b) (2011).
361. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020(d)(1)(ii) (2010).
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free-ride on these mandates, thereby reducing implementation
costs.
Establishing information storage requirements through
public law is challenging. Governmentally specified mandates
risk being overly costly, rapidly obsolete, or poorly tailored.362
Deference to private sector best practices, though, risks insufficient precautions. Firms in the same industry may be willing to
accept risks, such as cyberattacks, if those risks would cripple
all competitors equally. For example, firms often fail to take
adequate data security measures when they face little threat of
liability or significant reputational sanctions for data spills. 363
Thus, despite arguments that private sector precautions for cybersecurity are sufficient, this Article suggests that cybersecurity regulation of information should do three things: mandate
inefficiency in storage, test, and invest.364
1. Mandate Inefficient Storage
First, Congress should pass cybersecurity legislation that
requires information to be stored inefficiently. There are three
legislative dimensions to consider: which entities should be
covered, what inefficient storage means, and how to enforce the
mandate. The coverage dimension of cybersecurity has been the
subject of considerable controversy, primarily over what constitutes ―critical infrastructure‖ subject to enhanced regulation.365
The scope of such critical infrastructure has expanded greatly
over time, and particularly with increasing time after the ter-

362. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49, 49 (2010) (arguing that rules, specifically in industries characterized by dynamism, tend to be either under- or over-inclusive
and can be difficult to change).
363. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 925–32 (2007).
364. The need for such an regulation can be evidenced by looking to a recent cybersecurity summit in Dallas, TX. See generally Abigail Rabinowitz,
Protecting the Digital Economy, EASTWEST INST. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www
.ewi.info/protecting-digital-economy (showing arguments that the private sector and the public sector have not worked together effectively to promote cybersecurity and that greater collaboration is needed).
365. See, e.g., Cybersecurity: A Review of Public and Private Efforts to Secure Our Nation‘s Internet Infrastructure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census & Nat‘l Archives of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov‘t
Reform, 110th Cong. 23 (2007) (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director of
Information Security Issues, GAO), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08212t.pdf (noting that legislation on critical infrastructure protection does
not address Internet disruptions).
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rorist attacks of September 11, 2001.366 Ironically, this makes
later iterations of the term less useful for cybersecurity purposes. For example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,
signed by President George W. Bush on December 17, 2003,
sweeps in ―key resources,‖ along with critical infrastructure, as
targets for increased protection, where key resources include
national monuments and parks.367 Yellowstone National Park
is unlikely to hold sufficiently critical information to be worthy
of enhanced protection. Cybersecurity legislation could borrow
more specific definitions of what constitutes critical infrastructure in the United States in defining coverage, such as that
contained in President Bush‘s executive order establishing the
Office of Homeland Security in 2001.368 Section 3(e) of that executive order sets out a specific list of critical infrastructure
that the new office is charged with protecting against the consequences of terrorist attacks.369 This list of relevant industries
and economic sectors makes for a useful initial coverage set for
information inefficiency regulation.
An alternative approach to coverage, which would be more
precise but less accurate, would be to impose information inefficiency requirements on entities covered by existing legal requirements to perform data retention. This requirement would
be both over-inclusive (medical device manufacturers are not
necessarily vital to economic functioning)370 and underinclusive (not all ISPs would necessarily be covered).371 Howev366. See, e.g., JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32631, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND
IDENTIFICATION 6–7 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631
.pdf (describing the USA PATRIOT Act, which defines ―critical infrastructure‖).
367. Id. at 9–10; see also 6 U.S.C. § 101(9) (2006) (defining ―key resources‖);
42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e)(2006) (defining ―critical infrastructure‖ as systems and
assets ―so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact‖ on national security or
public health).
368. See generally Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the
Homeland Security Council, Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,813 (Oct.
8, 2001).
369. Id. at 51,813–14.
370. Cf. supra note 360 and accompanying text (implying that medical device manufacturers are not vital by having shorter required data retention periods than other industries).
371. Cf. Jaikumar Vijayan, DOJ Seeks Mandatory Data Retention Requirement for ISPs, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.computerworld
.com/s/article/9206379/DOJ_seeks_mandatory_data_retention_requirement_fo
r_ISPs (exploring the current state of data retention with ISPs and noting that
policy differences between entities has made lawful means of obtaining valua-
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er, this approach would include entities that have implemented
redundant data storage strategies already. While the new
mandate would increase the cost of existing strategies, the cost
differences would be incremental, rather than incorporating the
greater expenses of initial implementation.
The second critical legislative question is what inefficiency
means—in other words, what scope of information must be
stored inefficiently? Organizations already evaluate this issue
when implementing a data backup strategy.372 Retaining
greater volumes of data longitudinally allows an organization
to recover information farther back in time but boosts storage
costs and may generate greater legal exposure as more data
can be discovered in litigation.373 For regulators, this tradeoff is
made more complicated by the diversity of information needs
across sectors. Health service providers, for example, may need
to maintain data longer than other organizations. While patients may interact with their doctors infrequently, their complete medical histories are vital to proper treatment. Retail
businesses may have less need for historical data as customers
and customer needs change more rapidly. Regulators could either set a uniform requirement for data inefficiency or tailor
rules to each industry.374 Targeted rules align costs most closely with benefits, but they also involve greater administrative
costs in design and enforcement, and invite strategic behavior
by regulated entities.375
ble evidence ineffective in certain instances, thus suggesting that future laws
may have similar results).
372. See, e.g., W. CURTIS PRESTON, BACKUP & RECOVERY 14 (2007) (noting
the ―need to balance the cost of a particular backup implementation against
the projected monetary loss of the outage from which it protects you‖).
373. See, e.g., Laurie Miller et al., Document Retention Policies Revisited,
NIXON PEABODY LLP ( May 27, 2003), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_
media/publications/CRA_05272003.pdf (acknowledging that ―unnecessary document retention is prohibitively expensive‖ and can make responding to discovery requests difficult).
374. In regulating information practice in the private sector, for example,
the U.S. Federal Government has opted for industry-specific policies rather
than comprehensive legal rules. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for
Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500
(1995).
375. Cf. William Fisher III, The Disaggregation of Intellectual Property, 55
HARV. L. BULL. 24, 29–30 (2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/bulletin/2004/summer/feature_2-1.php (discussing the relative merits of
broad versus industry-specific rules for intellectual property and arguing that
disaggregation in rules is superior since industries vary in the amount of legal
incentives necessary to spur innovation and compliance).
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Determining the optimal period for retaining information
in an inefficient fashion, what information should be included,
and whether the retention period should vary by entity or industry are difficult empirical questions that require balancing
costs and benefits beyond the scope of this Article. Yet all policy
debates require a starting point. Accordingly, I propose the following rule, to apply to all regulated entities, as an initial requirement:
An organization shall maintain separate and redundant information
such that, within 24 hours of losing all access to its primary data
store, it is able to conduct operations in its ordinary course of operations for seven consecutive business days.

Put simply, each regulated organization should store information in a way that ensures that if it loses its primary data
bank, it is able to restore normal operations within a day, and
to continue those operations for a week. This rule is likely to be
risk-averse, or conservative, for two reasons. First, data from
disasters such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
suggest that many businesses are already able to return to operations within a few days, even after major disruptions.376
Shortening the exposure window to one day will create incremental costs, but it is not likely to be a disproportionate burden. Moreover, service level agreements (SLAs) with information service providers, such as IT outsourcing firms, often
mandate recovery of full operations in even shorter time periods.377 Verio, for example, offers storage services that provide
for data recovery in two hours during normal business operations, and in four hours during after-hours periods.378 Second,
larger and more sophisticated businesses generally operate redundant data centers, allowing them to switch operations between centers in case of disruption.379 For example, Oracle op376. For examples of rapid repairs to Internet connectivity following various disasters, see supra Part II.C.
377. See, e.g., Jonathan Raku Mathiesen, Service Level Agreements for Storage: Report and Sample Documents, PRESTOSPACE, 14 –15 (Feb. 23, 2007),
http://prestospace.org/project/deliverables/D13-5.pdf (showing that a Verio storage SLA requires a restoration time of four hours or less).
378. Id. at 15.
379. See, e.g., Rachel Melcer, Ready to Serve, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Jan. 9, 2008, at C1; Randall Stross, 99.999% Reliable? Don‘t Hold Your Breath,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at B3 (explaining Gmail‘s practice of using two perfectly mirrored live copies in addition to its backup copies stored offline But see
Joseph Menn & Michelle Quinn, Power Outage Shuts Down Websites, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 2007, at C3 (describing data center outage that knocked ecommerce firm RedEnvelope offline after RedEnvelope discontinued redundant data centers).
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erates mirrored global data centers in Texas and Colorado.380
This implies that larger entities will not find the new information efficiency mandate unduly burdensome. Smaller entities,
which are more likely to incur costs in transitioning to the new
regulatory scheme, can obtain some relief under the subsidy
provisions described below. Moreover, small organizations can
outsource services for information inefficiency, reducing their
cost burdens relative to in-house provisioning.381
An even more conservative rule would assume that disruptions to information will include physical as well as digital effects.382 This rule would require organizations to create inefficiency not only for information, but also for infrastructure. This
rule would read:
An organization shall maintain separate and redundant information
such that, within 24 hours of losing all access to its primary data
store and data or IT center, it is able to conduct operations in its ordinary course of operations for seven consecutive business days.
[changes italicized]

This version of the rule should be reserved (if used at all)
for vital information-driven industries such as the financial and
banking sectors, as its implementation costs could be significant. It mandates inefficiency in both information and information processing and may require covered entities to effectively
double their IT capacity.383 Thus, this more conservative, and
costly, regulation is one that should be tailored by industry sector—the added administrative costs of determining which areas
are appropriately covered is justified by the burden on those
regulated.
The last issue for regulation is enforcement. To be effective, enforcement regimes must be able to detect and sanction

380. Mahesh Sharma & Ben Woodhead, Australia on Radar as Safe Site for
Oracle Data Centre, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 28, 2007, at 29.
381. For a discussion of opportunities for small firms to achieve the same
benefits as large organizations by outsourcing IT functions, see Jennifer
Mears, SMBs: Outsourcing a Growth Tool, NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 27, 2006),
http://www.net-directions.com/info/.
382. For example, loss of power could jeopardize an organization‘s ability to
use its data center. See, e.g., John Holusha, Preserving Data, and Businesses,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at RE1.
383. But see Mears, supra note 381 (noting that although the cost of developing IT strategies can seem daunting, investing in such strategies can actually reduce an organization‘s expenses by defraying traditional capital investment in infrastructure and technology, thereby saving the organization money
long-term).
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violations predictably.384 Enforcement of the information inefficiency rule should turn on self-certification based on testing,
backed by randomized auditing of those testing procedures and
results for organizations that do not use outside auditors.385
This approach reduces enforcement costs to the public fisc by
transferring a portion of the costs to the regulated entities. This
approach also addresses the risk of cheating through the use of
credible third parties (accounting firms for publicly traded companies) and governmental inspection (for other entities).
Determining the proper level of sanctions for violations of
the rule is easy in principle but difficult in practice.386 Setting
penalties too high is problematic if the state has some error
rate in determining correctly whether a violation has occurred,
as firms may over-invest in precautions.387 Setting penalties too
low creates incentives for non-compliance.388 Given these uncertainties, and information asymmetries between regulators
and regulated entities, the best way to set a penalty for violators is to use market information. The regulation should require the Department of Commerce to impose a heightened fine
on violators who are detected through governmental audits
(which come at greater cost to the public treasury) or who have
had a prior violation in the past ten years.389 For these viola384. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (discussing an ―economic‖ approach to
enforcing legislation); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45,
45 (2000) (presenting ―the economic theory of public enforcement of law in a
systematic and comprehensive way‖).
385. See infra Part V.A.2 (arguing that organizations should be required to
test and certify their ability to comply with the proposed cybersecurity rules).
386. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of
Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3
(1992) (noting that complete deterrence of crimes is often not desirable because of the costs of enforcement).
387. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
474 –75 (2004) (discussing the chilling effect on desirable acts caused by sanctions that are greater than the harm sought to be deterred).
388. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1992) (considering the problem of setting
optimal sanctions when actors‘ information about the probability of apprehension is not perfect).
389. Cf. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for
Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 735– 40 (2001) (recognizing the historical
practice of escalating penalties for repeat violators and discussing how the
conventional economic model holds that ―an optimal expected penalty should
equal the harm [or cost] to society of the violation‖).
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tors, there should be a two-part penalty. First, the organization
must outsource its implementation of the information inefficiency rule for the next five years—and must engage a firm
qualified to audit publicly traded companies in the U.S. to report on its compliance with this penalty. This part of the sanction would force the violator to turn over compliance to a service provider capable of meeting regulatory requirements. In
addition, third-party monitoring should reduce recidivism at
the violator‘s expense.390
Second, the organization must pay a penalty equal to 1.5
times the average annual cost of the outsourcing. The fine
would remove any incentive to shirk compliance for cost reasons, as it would be less expensive simply to turn over information inefficiency operations to an outside service provider.
Moreover, the fine would solve the information asymmetry
problem that bedevils regulators when setting penalty levels391
by effectively imposing a market test: the violator has incentives to find the best value in outsourcing, knowing that its
bargain will also set its fine.
In addition, sanctions on repeat offenders should be made
public. This would increase the bite of market-based reputational sanctions and allow consumers to select away from organizations with poor cybersecurity.392 For example, the regulation could require that such sanctions be disclosed in
securities filings, as the SEC attempted to do with publicly
traded entities facing environmental liabilities.393 Revealing
organizations‘ failures to take adequate cybersecurity precautions would deter violations and improve market data for consumers seeking more resilient firms.
390. See generally Dilip Mookherjee & I.P.L. Png, Monitoring vis-à-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 556 (1992) (suggesting
that socially optimal sanctions balance the benefits derived by offenders
against the harm caused by non-offenders).
391. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction
Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47
ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 80–81 (2005) (describing the difficulty, both in terms of time
and cost, that pollution regulators would face in attempting to assign nonuniform pollution-reduction obligations on facilities).
392. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships,
104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 411–12 (1990) (arguing that ―reputational sanctions‖
correct for deficiencies in legal sanctions).
393. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, New Battles Over Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1990, at F10; William Baue, SEC Urged to Strengthen Rules Governing Corporate Disclosure of Environmental Risks, SOCIALFUNDS (Aug. 21,
2002), http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/911.html.
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First-time violators detected through private audits who
have not had a previous violation in the past decade should pay
a fine equal to three-quarters of the cost of one year of outsourcing.394 While determining the cost of outsourcing will impose some administrative expense on government regulators,
the existence of a competitive information technology services
market should provide reliable data at low cost. Overall, this
graduated-penalty scheme would minimize both enforcement
costs and incentives to avoid compliance.
Like the definition of information, the proposed requirement for inefficient data storage is purposive: it compels businesses to evaluate what information they need to operate normally after losing their usual ability to access and alter
content. The proposed requirement also builds on existing practices in data backup and recovery. Indeed, the federal government‘s Ready Business program encourages businesses to perform data backup, including storing redundant data offsite.395
Data inefficiency has side benefits for low-incidence, highmagnitude risks to information such as natural disasters or
hacking: recovery is the same regardless of the cause of information loss. The next Section of this Article discusses verifying
whether this inefficiency is sufficient.
2. Test
The second regulatory move that the U.S. should make to
improve the inefficiency of information storage is to mandate
that regulated entities—those required under the rules described above to keep redundant data—test whether their precautions are sufficient. Cybersecurity regulation should require
each organization to test its ability to meet the demands of the
recovery rule, and to certify the results. Moreover, these certifications should, after a one-year grace period following the
enactment of the implementing legislation, be made public.
This publicity should generate market-based and norms-based
pressures on organizations to comply.396 For publicly traded
394. The implementing legislation should bestow deference on the Department of Commerce to ascertain this cost through market information. Administrative costs could be minimized by simply allowing the Department of
Commerce to take a small sampling of price data from outsourcing firms based
on the violator‘s industry and size.
395. Improve Cyber Security, READY BUSINESS, http://www.ready.gov/
business/protect/cybersecurity.html ( last updated Apr. 26, 2011).
396. See Charny, supra note 392 (suggesting that ―reputational sanctions‖
provide strong incentives for organizations to comply with rules).
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companies, the verification process should be incorporated into
the testing of internal procedures and controls required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its implementing regulations.397 Building cybersecurity testing into existing Sarbanes-Oxley procedures should increase the reliability of
information inefficiency precautions at relatively minimal cost:
the check is simply one additional thing that auditors verify.
For companies not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley, the testing
requirement—while necessary to ensure that information inefficiency measures are not illusory or ineffective—would
represent a potentially significant added cost. Sarbanes-Oxley‘s
regulatory regime has itself come under criticism as unduly
costly.398 However, the added expense is justified by the cybersecurity benefits. Moreover, there are at least three responses
to this objection. First, there is an existing industry of firms,
particularly accounting firms, that have experience with Sarbanes-Oxley monitoring and certification.399 While engaging a
firm will create costs for an organization, competitive pressures
among accounting, IT services, and related firms will constrain
prices. The burden for firms does not seem likely to be significant, particularly when all entities in the same industry face
roughly similar costs. For example, a survey of large enterprises in 2006 found the average cost to comply with SarbanesOxley‘s requirements for financial controls, including auditors‘
fees, was $2.92 million.400 Moreover, costs had fallen 35% from
2004, when firms were first obligated to comply.401 Costs, then,
397. See generally Management‘s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm (establishing
Sarbanes-Oxley reporting requirements).
398. See generally Anwer S. Ahmed et al., How Costly Is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the Effects of the Act on Corporate Profitability, 16 J.
CORP. FIN. 352 (2010); James Freeman, The Supreme Case Against SarbanesOxley, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748704431804574539921864252380.html; Sarbanes-Oxley Audits Too Costly, Regulator Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
09/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-sec.2875515.html.
399. See Matthew J. Barrett, Sarbanes-Oxley, Kermit the Frog, and Competition Regarding Audit Quality, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207, 211–13 (2008) (identifying multiple tiers of firms with expertise in Sarbanes-Oxley auditing).
400. SEC Moves to Reduce Sarbanes-Oxley Costs, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-regs.4.5843700
.html (describing study by Financial Executives International).
401. Id.
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were not only manageable, but decreasing as firms became
more experienced with the regulation—as a percentage of revenues, costs were lower in 2007 than in 2006.402 As with Sarbanes-Oxley, initial expenditures for implementing information
inefficiency, and for testing those new systems, are likely to be
high, but are also likely to drop with time. Moreover, much of
that initial expenditure will be directly beneficial to organizations by enabling them to reduce cybersecurity risks. Second,
the public subsidy described below will defray at least part of
the cost that organizations must assume. Finally, either cybersecurity is a significant risk to U.S. interests or it is not.403 Imposing cost burdens, and overcoming resistance from regulated
entities, is in some sense the acid test of regulation. If the risks
from a lack of cybersecurity are at all like those described in
Part II, testing and reporting costs are a small price to pay. Data backups, it is said, are worthless until needed—then, they
are priceless. This applies with equal force to cybersecurity.
3. Invest
Finally, legislation to implement information inefficiency
should provide financial support for organizations that will face
new data requirements. This is, in effect, public investment in
private cybersecurity. These new technology and testing costs
may particularly affect small businesses that are not publicly
traded. Subsidizing initial costs, particularly for small businesses, will both increase compliance and reduce political resistance to the new regulatory scheme. The public subsidy should
be gradually phased out over time, as firms absorb initial overhead costs of the new information systems, and as testing and
monitoring costs fall. This method has been used in other regulatory contexts with cost burdens: companies with fewer than
twenty-five workers, and average annual employee pay of less
than $40,000, will receive tax credits to underwrite health insurance premiums under the new health care legislation; the
subsidy lasts for up to two years for each business.404 Along
similar lines, small businesses pay lower fees to the Food and
Drug Administration for required medical device product re402. FEI Survey: Average 2007 SOX Compliance Cost $1.7 Million, FEI,
(Apr. 30, 2008), http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=204.
403. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 27, at 179–80 (discussing transformation of
cybersecurity into a national security issue).
404. Courtney Rubin, What Health Care Reform Means for Your Business,
INC. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.inc.com/news/articles/2010/03/health-care-reform
-and-small-business.html.
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views.405 Spending tax revenues to support compliance costs is
preferable to exempting small businesses from the cybersecurity requirements, which is another common approach to reducing regulatory burdens. (Congress and the SEC faced significant pressure, for example, to exempt small businesses from
the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements,406 and companies with fewer
than fifty employees are exempt from offering their workers
health insurance under the new health care legislation.407 Similarly, small businesses are exempt, under certain conditions,
from registering under the Securities Act of 1934 when offering
securities.408) Thus, Congress should offer transitional support
for organizations, particularly small ones, while they work to
come into compliance with the information inefficiency requirements of cybersecurity legislation.
There are at least two ways that Congress could invest in
organizations‘ creation of inefficient data storage. First, implementing legislation could offer a tax credit to regulated entities.409 If Congress considered it important to ensure predictability of tax expenditures on this aspect of cybersecurity, it
could either set a maximum total payment, as with tax credits
for purchases of fuel-efficient hybrid cars,410 or it could combine
a cap on per-entity deductions with a more limited scope of eligibility. Second, legislation could require entities facing the
new requirements to apply for grants that would cover part or
all of their expenditures. For example, the economic stimulus
legislation of 2009 created a similar funding system for broad-

405. PMA Review Fees, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/
PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/UCM048161.htm ( last updated Sept. 13, 2011).
406. See SEC Moves to Reduce Sarbanes-Oxley Costs, supra note 400.
407. Rubin, supra note 404.
408. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .508 (2011) (―Regulation D‖).
409. The federal government uses a similar method to encourage provision
of employer-based health insurance: employer premiums are excluded from
employees‘ taxable income. See BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767,
THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: POLICY
ISSUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 9–11 (2008), available at http://www
.allhealth.org/BriefingMaterials/RL34767-1359.pdf.
410. The credit is phased out based on the number of cars sold by each qualifying manufacturer. See Qualified Hybrid Vehicles, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=203122,00.html
( last updated Aug. 25, 2011).
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band deployment projects.411 The grant system would impose
higher administrative costs than a tax credit, but in return
could achieve greater targeting of funding and greater cost predictability.
Cybersecurity regulation should thus require entities with
sufficiently important functions to store information inefficiently by mandating that they be capable of operating for a week on
redundant data, by having those organizations test their abilities to do so, and by subsidizing on a short-term basis their investments in inefficiency. The next Section describes the second
component of the proposed regulation: bolstering the positive
aspects of access and alteration through inefficiency in network
connections.
B. OVERLAPPING STRANDS
Don‘t become Egypt.
This message is a succinct summary of the informationbased framework‘s second suggestion, which is to increase the
inefficiency of network connections in the United States. During the popular uprising against the government of President
Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, activists used Web-based methods such as e-mail, Twitter, and Facebook to plan demonstrations and to exchange information.412 Egypt‘s government
reacted with the Internet equivalent of the death penalty: it
severed connections from Egyptian ISPs to the international
network.413 There are two accounts of how Mubarak‘s government took Egypt offline. In one, the government cut data links
to the outside world not via clever technical means, but with
phone calls to Egypt‘s five major ISPs, which provide routing to
the wider Internet.414 In fifteen minutes on January 27, 2011,
Egypt‘s ISPs withdrew BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) from
routing tables, leaving no paths by which data could reach users inside the country.415 In the second, the key work was performed by the country‘s Communications Ministry, which shut
411. See Program Information, NAT‘L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., http://
www2.ntia.doc.gov/information ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (describing broadband grant program under American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).
412. Egypt Protests: Anti-Mubarak Demonstrators Arrested, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12289475.
413. Matt Richtel, Egypt Halts Most Internet and Cell Service, and Scale of
Shutdown Surprises Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at A13.
414. James Cowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, RENESYS (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet.shtml.
415. Id.
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down Egypt‘s Internet Exchange Point (IXP) in Cairo, blocking
data flow across the digital border.416 The remaining links were
cut by ISPs on orders from the Egyptian internal security service.417 It helped considerably that Egypt was governed by an
authoritarian regime that could deploy state pressure against
ISP operators, and shut down the key IXP, with few checks.418
The most important characteristic that let Mubarak‘s government make the Internet go dark for Egyptians, though, is that
there were only a handful of choke points that it needed to control to shut down connectivity. Five phone calls—or one flipped
switch in a data center—knocked Egypt off-line.419 Egypt is a
cautionary tale for cybersecurity efforts. Having a few points of
failure where the network is vulnerable to disruption greatly
increases the threat to information. Widely distributed, redundant data is of little value if the pathways to it are cut.
Ironically, influential voices in the current cybersecurity
dialogue actually favor re-designing U.S. networks to look precisely like Egypt‘s topology. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense is moving to reduce the number of Internet connections
between its NIRPNET network (used to share sensitive, but
unclassified, information) and the wider Internet.420 Clarke and
Knake argue for creating break points in America‘s connectivity to the wider Internet, allowing the U.S. to raise the digital
drawbridge in case of an attack.421 But this tactic did not save
Hosni Mubarak, and it would not save America, either. Data
could still travel within U.S. networks—all an attacker would
need would be access to computers located within American
borders, such as via botnet.422 Moreover, the U.S. is arguably
the country with the greatest dependency on information flow
across the Internet.423 Breaking connections with the rest of the
world might inflict more damage than it prevented. Even if sui416. Ryan Singel, Report: Egypt Shut Down Net with Big Switch, Not
Phone Calls, WIRED (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/
egypt-off-switch/. An Internet Exchange Point is a location on the network
where data is sorted into that destined for international endpoints and that
destined for domestic ones. Id.
417. Id.
418. Internet Filtering in Egypt, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 6, 2009), http://
opennet.net/research/profiles/Egypt.
419. Id.
420. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 171.
421. Id. at 272–76.
422. Clarke and Knake concede as much. Id. at 209.
423. Id. at xiii.
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cide is preferable to homicide, the body still dies. Finally, such
a change in network layout would be surpassingly expensive.
Consolidating connections to foreign networks would require
private companies to give up valuable infrastructure, and
would raise hard questions regarding which entities should retain connectivity. In short, America should not envy Egypt‘s
network.
The information-focused theory suggests that Internet
connectivity should be inefficient—it should be redundant,
running over different types of networks in different physical
and logical locations, under the control of different operators.
Data should be capable of flowing across multiple networks,
connected at multiple points that are physically and logically
independent. The United States has a built-in advantage regarding inefficiency. Unlike countries such as China424 and
Saudi Arabia,425 which designed their network topologies from
scratch to enable concentrated points of control426 where methods such as filtering could be applied, America‘s networks grew
chaotically and organically, based on market demand and organizational self-interest. However, U.S. connectivity still
evinces a number of locations that could act as choke points.427
Sean Gorman, a graduate student at George Mason University,
mapped the major fiber optic cable routes in the U.S. for his
Ph.D. dissertation; there are locations where physical disruption could have significant repercussions for Internet connectivity.428 (Indeed, Gorman has separately noted that a severed cable in 1990 shut down all three of New York City‘s airports,
along with the New York Mercantile Exchange.)429 Moreover,
the ongoing deployment of high-capacity fiber worsens the
problem, as network providers consolidate onto those cables
and reduce redundancy for cost reasons.430 And fiber optic
424. See, e.g., GREG WALTON, CHINA‘S GOLDEN SHIELD 9 (2001).
425. Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2006–2007, OPENNET INITIATIVE
(2007), http://opennet.net/studies/saudiarabia2007.
426. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 653 (2003) (discussing transit points in regards to Internet regulation).
427. See, e.g., SEAN P. GORMAN, NETWORKS, SECURITY AND COMPLEXITY
11–27 (2005) (discussing various threats to connectivity such as power failures
in certain geographic areas).
428. Laura Blumenfeld, Dissertation Could Be Security Threat, WASH.
POST, July 8, 2003, at A1.
429. Sean P. Gorman, Is There a Cybersecurity Threat to National Security: An Interpretive Analysis (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
gembinski.com/interactive/GMU/research/Cyber_threat_paper.pdf.
430. Id. at 4.
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cables, if damaged, must be repaired manually in a timeconsuming process.431
The physical connections along which Internet data travel
tend to be co-located with transportation routes such as rail
lines and highways; damage to the roads or tracks could also
cut network connections.432 These routes themselves may have
significant bottlenecks.433 Inefficient connections may be particularly scarce in urban areas,434 where constraints on physical location (such as the need to share utility poles, or conduits
running beneath streets) may press providers to consolidate
physical connectivity. And history matters: it is up to ten times
as expensive to retrofit connectivity channels beneath roads as
it is to install them during initial construction.435 Thus, it is
particularly helpful to have inefficiency in physical modes of
connectivity.
This is an area where the United States faces an infrastructure challenge. Most customers—both residential and
business—are served by, at most, two broadband network providers: their local telephone service provider (offering DSL),
and their local cable company.436 Both modalities generally rely
on wired connections, and those wired connections are often co-

431. See, e.g., Lindsay Goldwert, How Do You Fix an Undersea Cable?,
SLATE (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.slate.com/id/2156987/.
432. Mitchell L. Moss & Anthony M. Townsend, The Internet Backbone and
the American Metropolis, 16 INFO. SOC‘Y 35, 39 (2000).
433. The intercontinental railroad system that crosses the U.S. depends on
a single switching yard located outside Cincinnati, and there are only six railroad bridges across the Mississippi and Missouri rivers large enough to carry
commercial traffic. Robert D. Steele, Takedown: Targets, Tools, and Technology, in CHALLENGING THE UNITED STATES SYMMETRICALLY AND ASYMMETRICALLY: CAN AMERICA BE DEFEATED? 123, 124 –25 (Lloyd J. Matthews ed.,
1998).
434. See Moss & Townsend, supra note 432, at 41– 46.
435. Ryan Singel, Senators Introduce ―Run the Tubes Under The Highway‖
Bill, WIRED (June 15, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/06/senators
-introduce-run-the-tubes-under-the-highway-bill/.
436. FED. COMMC‘NS COMM‘N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 3, 11 (2010), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296239A1.pdf (finding that
cable and DSL connections comprised 77% of broadband access, and that mobile wireless devices, such as smartphones, comprised 18%). See generally
BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC‘Y, NEXT GENERATION CONNECTIVITY: A
REVIEW OF BROADBAND INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY FROM AROUND
THE WORLD 82–83 (2009), available at http://www.fcc.gov/stage/pdf/Berkman_
Center_Broadband_Study_13Oct09.pdf (identifying the historical trends in
American telecommunications expansion).
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located for significant portions of their runs.437 Building inefficiency into the physical pathways, via diversity, creates resilience in case of disruptions, and more rapid recovery from service interruptions. For example, when a backhoe operator
severed a fiber optic cable in the Yukon, Internet service was
dramatically slowed.438 The network provider, Northwestel,
was able to maintain some connectivity, however, because it
had maintained a set of radio towers as a back-up system.439
When Egypt‘s government cut Internet connections to the rest
of the world, some users were able to maintain access by using
satellite-based services.440 A group of hackers used fax machines to spread information about international dial-up Internet access to Libyans when Libya‘s former government regime
cut standard Internet access during anti-government demonstrations.441 As described above, the attacks of September 11,
2001 severed Internet connections even for firms that had purchased redundant connections—but whose multiple Internet
pathways flowed through the same physical space in Manhattan.442 Thus, it would be useful to increase cybersecurity by
causing network service providers to build out additional capacity and connections.
Regulating America‘s network providers, however, has historically been challenging. Firms offering Internet access and
transport have been quick to contest attempts to constrain
their behavior in contexts from network neutrality,443 to common carriage requirements,444 to content filtering.445 Moreover,
437. See generally Kevin Poulsen, The Backhoe: A Real Cyberthreat, WIRED
(Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/01/70040?
currentPage=all (describing the sustained damage potential from severed fiber-optics).
438. Tristin Hopper, Backhoe Severs Information Superhighway, YUKON
NEWS (June 12, 2009), http://www.yukon-news.com/news/13179/. While this
incident took place in Canada, the problem is precisely analogous for the United States.
439. Id.
440. James Glanz & John Markoff, Egypt‘s Autocracy Found Internet‘s ‗Off ‘
Switch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A1.
441. Sean Bonner, Operation ―Libya White Fax‖, BOINGBOING (Feb. 21, 2011,
10:52 AM), http://www.boingboing.net/2011/02/21/operation-libya-whit.html.
442. See supra Part II.C.
443. Comcast v. Fed. Commc‘ns Comm‘n, 600 F.3d 642, 644 – 45 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
444. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomm‘ns Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 973–80 (2005).
445. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610–11
(E.D. Pa. 2004).
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the vast majority of network infrastructure in the U.S. is privately owned.446 Network providers have topologies and redundancy levels that meet (but rarely exceed) their customers‘ demands—routing data is a competitive market, and excess
capacity creates needless cost. Most, if not all, peering agreements between network service providers operate on a bestefforts model: there are no service-level agreements that promise a certain measure of reliability or access.447 Accordingly,
there are fewer contractual or competitive forces driving investment in guaranteed connectivity. Telecommunications
companies were chastened by the industry‘s financial crisis in
the early years of the twenty-first century, which was generated primarily by overinvestment in network capacity.448 Thus,
creating inefficiency in network connectivity requires private
entities to take on investments in capacity that cannot be costjustified as investments.449 Governmental regulation that
forces providers to build out their networks without concomitant demand is likely to be resisted fiercely.
Regulation to increase the inefficiency of Internet connections in the U.S. should therefore do three things: subsidize interconnection, mandate connectivity during disputes, and expand last-resort options.
1. Subsidize
Put simply, if the U.S. government believes network providers should deliberately incur the costs of inefficient connectivity, it should pay for that belief. Routing data is a competitive industry, and firms strive to match build-out to demand,
and to projected demand.450 Requiring network providers to
446. NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, at 2.
447. Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 6 (Fed. Commc‘ns Comm‘n, Office of Plans & Policy Working Paper No.
32, 2000), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/
oppwp32.pdf; see, e.g., Verizon Business Policy for Settlement-Free Interconnection with Internet Networks, VERIZON, http://www.verizonbusiness.com/terms/
peering/ ( last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
448. ELI M. NOAM, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA
268–69 (2009).
449. See generally Poulsen, supra note 437 (noting Sprint decided against
physically separated data paths based on cost).
450. See, e.g., GAO, GAO-04 -241, WIRE-BASED COMPETITION BENEFITED
CONSUMERS IN SELECTED MARKETS 1, 12–17 (2004), available at http://www
.gao.gov/new.items/d04241.pdf; Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to
Competition: Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24
YALE J. ON REG. 55, 69–76 (2007).
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carry excess capacity to ensure resilience in the face of a cyberattack will increase costs. There are two ways to cover these
costs: by forcing ISPs to pass them through to customers, and
by paying for them directly. The former is a tax, and the latter
is a subsidy. The inefficient network connectivity is intended to
benefit all American users (and perhaps all users generally) attached to the Internet—it constitutes a benefit conferred by
providers onto users who are not their customers, and therefore
is a classic positive externality.451 Funding inefficient connections through a tax effectively causes an ISP‘s customers to
subsidize Internet users generally and non-customers in particular. This may be acceptable if all users pay the tax at some
point (because all users are customers of at least one ISP), but
it seems more efficient to use a governmental subsidy. With a
subsidy, administrative costs are lower: the State avoids the
expense of collecting the tax from ISP customers, as it must incur the costs of funding additional connectivity under either
system. This approach also has the benefit of being more politically acceptable to network providers, who might otherwise oppose this change, although it does increase the financial burden
on the public.
Fortunately, the Obama administration has already shown
a willingness to fund connectivity through the Department of
Commerce‘s Broadband Technology Opportunities Program
(BTOP), which distributed roughly $3.5 billion to build 120,000
miles of broadband network to connect underserved communities.452 BTOP grew out of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which used tax revenues to fund public
infrastructure as an economic stimulus.453 Investing in redundant connectivity is not merely a way to create additional Internet infrastructure, it is also protection—insurance—against
cybersecurity risks. Government is often the insurer of last
resort for high-magnitude, low-incidence risks such as terrorism, floods, and natural disasters, and so public spending
seems justified here.454
451. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 488–91 (1998).
452. NAT‘L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF GRANT AWARDS 3– 4 (2010), available at
http://ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_report_on_btop_12142010_0.pdf.
453. Id. at 2.
454. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of
Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 783 (2005); Dwight Jaffee & Thomas
Russell, Markets Under Stress: The Case of Extreme Event Insurance, in ECO-
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The governmental subsidy should cover three things: buildout of additional network backbone; transit for Tier 2 ISPs in
cases where peering is not economically feasible; and an annual
grant system for Tier 3 ISPs.455 Building additional network
backbone to create redundant connections is relatively
straightforward: Congress should allocate money for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to
spend. Adducing a budget figure for this spending is difficult,
primarily because the size of the task is hard to scope. Maps of
the Internet backbone at a physical level are fragmentary, partly due to competitive concerns among providers, and partly due
to physical security concerns among providers and with the
government.456 As described above, a graduate student who
produced the best such map was at significant risk of having
his work classified, and his research has not been made publicly available. Thus, the first step that Congress should take is to
fund NTIA to undertake a study to map the Internet backbone
in the United States, including interconnection points, physical
location, type of physical connectivity (such as fiber optic cable),
ownership, and average and peak traffic data. The study should
also attempt to estimate cost for major backbone segments: how
much would it cost to create a redundant connection in a separate physical location? To overcome provider reluctance to
share competitive data, legislation authorizing the study
should limit public dissemination to aggregate data, perhaps at
the regional level, so as to obscure cost differences between
providers.457
Second—though perhaps most important—the subsidies
should defray, in whole or in large part, the cost of additional
connectivity for Tier 2 ISPs. Tier 2 network providers are those
that are too small to route data solely through peering arrangements; they must pay for access to at least some routes or
networks.458 The inefficiency goal for Tier 2 providers is to elimNOMICS FOR AN IMPERFECT

WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
35, 49 (Richard Arnott et al., eds., 2003); Warming Cited for $900 Billion Insurance Risk, MSNBC (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18228964/
ns/us_news-environment/.
455. On defining tiers of ISPs, see HANDBOOK OF ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION 66–67 ( Mostafa Hashem Sherif ed., 2010).
456. See supra notes 427– 3 0 and accompanying text.
457. Cf. Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1789749 (discussing data protection and anonymization techniques).
458. Peering is a business arrangement between ISPs, who agree to carry
each other‘s traffic without remuneration. See William B. Norton, Internet
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inate single points of failure and, optimally, to have the capability to route traffic (even at degraded speeds) even if connections to upstream Tier 1 ISPs were severed. Tier 2 providers
should be encouraged to peer with one another. Where peering
is not economically feasible, public funding should cover transit
costs to ensure that each Tier 2 ISP can peer, and thereby route
data in the event of loss of all upstream connectivity to Tier 1
providers. To prevent Tier 2 providers from engaging in strategic behavior, such as charging other similarly situated providers for transit instead of peering with them, the funding
formula should use an offset: each provider would receive funds
to cover their transit costs, net of what they charge to other
Tier 2 ISPs. This approach would also helpfully provide greater
subsidies to smaller providers.
Lastly, the subsidy should cover some costs of greater connectivity, and hence greater inefficiency, for Tier 3 providers.
These ISPs rarely peer, but instead purchase connectivity.
Their networks may contain single points of failure, with but
one source of upstream connectivity due to cost constraints.459
While increasing inefficiency for Tier 3 ISPs seems attractive, it
may not be sensible. It might be more efficient for downstream
customers to instead purchase service from a Tier 2 ISP. Thus,
it is not certain that dedicating funding to Tier 3 providers is
desirable. A compromise solution would be for Congress to authorize a set amount for grants by NTIA to Tier 3 ISPs, along
the lines of the successful BTOP program.460 Tier 3 providers
could apply for grants to cover additional connectivity, based on
the number of downstream users served (with preference to
larger ISPs); the level of competitive alternatives in their market (with preference to providers of last resort); and the proposal‘s cost-effectiveness. The funding criteria should be deliberately Darwinian: more efficient and effective Tier 3 ISPs
should preferentially receive support.
Proposing additional government spending is problematic
at a time of economic downturn and political concern about
budget deficits. However, spending is where political rhetoric
about cybersecurity risks is tested. Consider, for example, that
President Obama‘s 2012 budget requested only $548 million in

Service Providers and Peering (Sept. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.nanog.org/papers/isp.peering.doc.
459. HANDBOOK OF ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION, supra note 455.
460. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
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spending for cybersecurity research and development,461 compared with $921 million in research project grants for the National Institute of Mental Health.462 Precautions are likely to be
relatively inexpensive. Total BTOP expenditures on broadband
of $3.48 billion, for example, were only 70 % of the National
Cancer Institute‘s budget in 2010.463 They equal roughly 4.4%
of estimated 2010 expenditures by the Department of Defense
for research, development, testing, and evaluation.464 By comparison, the federal government allocated $1 billion for federal
food safety465 and flood insurance programs466 in 2010. While
the BTOP allocation is an inexact guide for cybersecurity investment, it is representative. If cybersecurity threats are real,
government should be prepared to spend to abate them. Moreover, contemporary rhetoric that paints cybersecurity risks as
national security threats can help make spending more palatable, as it is politically difficult to oppose national security programs.467
2. Mandate Connectivity During Disputes
Second, regulation to produce inefficient connectivity
should seek to preserve existing links between backbone providers. Disputes over peering arrangements—over costs of carrying traffic—are common between Tier 1 ISPs. Cogent, for example, is frequently involved in peering disputes due to its cutrate pricing policy. Cogent became involved in tussles with
461. Patrick Thibodeau, Obama Seeks Big Boost in Cybersecurity Spending,
COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9209461/Obama_seeks_big_boost_in_cybersecurity_spending?taxonomyId=70.
462. NAT. INSTS. OF HEALTH, FY 2012 BUDGET 4, available at http://www
.nimh.nih.gov/about/budget/cj2012.pdf.
463. NAT. INSTS. OF HEALTH, HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 2000–2010, available at http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/
pdfs/FY11/Approp.%20History%20by%20IC%20(FINAL).pdf (documenting NCI
budget of $5.1 billion in 2010).
464. U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., FINANCIAL SUMMARY TABLES: DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 10 (2009), available at http://
comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_summary_tables_whole.pdf.
465. U.S. DEP‘T OF AGRIC., FY 2010 BUDGET SUMMARY AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 68, available at http://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/FY10
budsum.pdf.
466. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: FACTORS AFFECTING ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS 1–2 (Nov. 2009),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10620/11-04-FloodInsurance.pdf.
467. Cf. GEORGE LAKOFF, DON‘T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! 58, 68 (2004) (describing how the national security metaphor has been employed to advocate
for various policy goals).
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AOL in 2002, Level 3 and France Telecom in 2005, Limelight
Networks in 2007, and Telia in 2008.468 In each case, Cogent or
its adversary ―de-peered‖ the other—they stopped accepting the
other provider‘s traffic, voluntarily severing a major network
connection.469 This made it more difficult for their customers to
communicate.470 For example, Martha Stewart Living‘s website is hosted by Cogent, and during the company‘s dispute with
Telia, Telia users could not reach it.471 De-peering moves are a
common means to pressure another network provider to accede
to terms.472 They are also a significant cybersecurity risk.
Regulation should prohibit network providers from ceasing to
carry their peers‘ traffic until alternative arrangements are
made.
Banning de-peering could significantly alter arrangements
between backbone network providers. De-peering is self-help: it
forces a connecting provider to choose between negotiating and
finding alternative routing. Thus, de-peering may serve a helpful dispute resolution function. However, the costs of breaking
connections between backbone providers are too high from a security perspective. De-peering reduces network redundancy,
and could create a window of opportunity for cyberthreats. In
addition, a ban would come with two significant limitations
that would make its drawbacks less potent. First, it would apply only when network providers were operating under a peering agreement—where they were exchanging roughly equal data volumes, without cost recovery. Most peering disputes
involve parties of roughly equal bargaining power.473 If providers were to opt to enter into a peering arrangement, they would
do so knowing their tools for altering the bargain were more
468. Rich Miller, Cogent Unplugs Telia in Peering Dispute, DATA CENTER
KNOWLEDGE ( Mar. 16, 2008), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/
2008/03/16/cogent-unplugs-telia-in-peering-dispute/.
469. See id.
470. See Rich Miller, Peering Dispute Between Cogent, Sprint, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 31, 2008, 9:56 AM), http://www.datacenterknowledge
.com/archives/2008/10/31/peering-dispute-between-cogent-sprint/.
471. Tom Corelis, Internet Rift Opens Over ISP Peering Dispute, DAILY
TECH ( Mar. 22, 2008, 8:15 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/Internet+Rift+
Opens+over+ISP+Peering+Dispute/article11199.htm.
472. See id. (―De-peering disputes often devolve into a game of ‗chicken,‘
where the two companies try to completely cut off each other‘s traffic; the onus
of response is left to whichever company has the largest customer uproar
when their networks stop working and websites become inaccessible.‖).
473. See e.g., id. (discussing a de-peering example involving ―two of the
world‘s larger bandwidth providers‖).
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limited than under fee-based carriage. Second, providers would
be expressly permitted to initiate litigation to recover costs of
traffic carried in excess of that transmitted—in short, to obtain
damages as recompense. In addition, providers should be authorized, after a cooling-off period of thirty days, to seek injunctive relief in federal district court that would allow them to depeer.474 District courts should grant such injunctions under the
standard four-part equitable analysis for preliminary injunctions, with particular attention to the public interest factor.475
This would allow providers an exit strategy from particularly
unprofitable or troublesome arrangements, after a delay sufficient to allow the other party to develop alternative routing
strategies.
The limited de-peering ban would strongly push providers
to maintain peering arrangements with one another by increasing the costs of exit. While this could cause ISPs to enter into
peering arrangements more reluctantly, this is mitigated by
peering‘s cost advantages for providers, who do not need to
measure and bill traffic flow. Moreover, U.S. law does not hesitate to limit negotiating tactics where there are significant
third-party interests at stake. President Ronald Reagan fired
air traffic controllers who violated a statutory ban on striking,476 and public safety workers such as police and firefighters
are often prohibited from labor actions.477 Thus, a party‘s right
to renegotiate terms by withholding may be barred because of
negative effects on those not at the bargaining table. While
temporarily preventing ISPs from de-peering will alter negotiation dynamics, the limited cost is worth the gains in inefficiency
of network paths.
3. Expand Alternatives
Lastly, regulation should seek to increase the heterogeneity of Internet connectivity, at least as a fallback measure. The
goal is to promote ad hoc measures that can route data when
ordinary networks are disrupted. This approach has been ex474. The thirty-day clock would begin when the ISP filed suit.
475. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 25–26 (2008)
(holding that the public interest favored the Navy‘s continued use of sonar radar over the interests of marine mammals who might be harmed).
476. Andrew Glass, Reagan Fires 11,000 Striking Air Traffic Controllers
Aug. 5, 1981, POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2008, 4:30 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0808/12292.html.
477. WILLIAM H. HOLLEY ET AL., THE LABOR RELATIONS PROCESS 572–73
(9th ed. 2008).
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plored by scholars such as Yochai Benkler, who argues that
open wireless networks could substitute—at least where there
is adequate density of network devices—for traditional Internet
access provisioning.478 This ―spectrum commons‖ approach suggests a peer-production model of routing that is an inefficient
yet highly flexible ad hoc solution.479 Ironically, this goal may
require government to de-regulate. One example is the proposal
by former FCC chair Kevin Martin to relinquish control over
the 700MHz spectrum band to enable open wireless broadband.480 While Martin‘s proposal was not adopted,481 it shows
that government can sometimes increase Internet access diversity by giving up control.
Ad hoc solutions can be surprisingly robust. The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 damaged most of
the country‘s backbone network and telecom data centers.482
Aid groups rely heavily on Internet-based communication to
coordinate efforts. NetHope, a humanitarian technology organization, identified a non-governmental organization with satellite-based Internet access, and created a patched-together mesh
network linking recovery teams to the single access point.483
NetHope‘s coordinator emphasized two lessons: ―Wireless is
where it‘s at [and] . . . [w]e‘re far better off investing in emergency preparedness . . . .‖484 Similarly, a team of researchers at
the Research Centre for Disaster Resilience and Health at Australia‘s Flinders University created the Serval Project, which

478. Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 25, 32 (2002).
479. See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons
of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 287, 293–94
(1998) (describing the spectrum commons approach).
480. See Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762, and 777-792 MHz Bands,
22 FCC Rcd. 15,288, 15,558 (Aug. 17, 2007) (statement of Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman, FCC), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
FCC-07-132A2.pdf.
481. See Paul Kapustka, FCC Punts on 700 MHz Rulemaking, GIGAOM
(Apr. 25, 2007, 6:23 PM), http://gigaom.com/2007/04/25/fcc-punts-on-700-mhz
-rulemaking/ (reporting a delay in adopting rules for the 700 MHz spectrum
auction).
482. Todd Bishop, How Haiti Got the Internet Back, With Help From a Guy
in Seattle, TECHFLASH (May 14, 2010, 9:19 AM), http://www.techflash.com/seattle/
2010/05/how_haiti_got_back_online_with_help_from_former_microsoft_exec.html.
483. Id.
484. Id.
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links mobile phone handsets into a local wi-fi network.485 Tests
of Serval have shown that each handset can act as a router at a
distance of up to several hundred meters.486 Engineers from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology have developed FabFi,
an ad hoc mesh wireless network that builds repeater stations
for around $60, made from chicken wire and locally available
materials, and that provides broadband Internet access over an
area with a six kilometer radius.487
An additional option would be for government itself to provide routing paths that are less dependent on wired networks.
Various cities and municipalities have experimented with ―muni wi-fi‖ in the past several years, but most attempts foundered
under cost pressures488 and telecommunications industry resistance.489 However, municipal wi-fi, even in paid form or as a
public-private partnership, offers significant positive cybersecurity externalities. It can serve as a fallback if commercial
providers experience disruption. The experience of Minneapolis
after the collapse of the city‘s I-35 bridge offers an example.
The city had entered a partnership with US Internet, an ISP
that eventually built a $20 million wireless network covering
95% of Minneapolis.490 At the time of the collapse, US Internet
had deployed a small test-network near the bridge.491 When
emergency responders overloaded the local mobile phone net485. Lin Edwards, New Project Enables Mobile Phone Use in Areas with No
Reception, PHYSORG.COM (July 14, 2010), http://www.physorg.com/news
198298057.html.
486. Id.
487. Sebastian Anthony, Afghanistan‘s DIY Internet Brings the Web to WarTorn Towns, EXTREMETECH (June 22, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://www.extremetech
.com/internet/87496-afganistans-diy-internet-brings-the-web-to-citizens-without
-roads-and-water.
488. See Tim Wu, Where‘s My Free Wi-Fi?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2007, 12:53
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2174858/pagenum/all/ (explaining that municipal wi-fi systems could not compete with private Internet-service providers).
489. See, e.g., Chris Gonsalves, Wi-Fi Flap Nixes Deal, EWEEK, Dec. 12,
2005, at 28, available at http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-Wireless/Muni
-WiFi-Flap-Nixes-Deal-in-New-Orleans/; Wayne Hanson, Pennsylvania Municipalities Have One Year to Develop WiFi Networks, GOV. TECH. (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://www.govtech.com/e-government/Pennsylvania-Municipalities-Have-One
-Year-to.html. See generally Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal
Broadband Access as Antitrust and Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 1697, 1726–63 (2006) (discussing how broadband deregulation contributed to the creation of broadband monopolies and duopolies).
490. Russell Nichols, How to Make Municipal Wi-Fi Work, DIGITAL COMMUNITIES (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/How
-to-Make-Municipal-Wi-Fi-Work.html.
491. Id.
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work with traffic, US Internet made its wireless network available for free, enabling emergency services to coordinate more
quickly and efficiently.492 Having governmental networks carry
traffic in the event of disruption is a symbolic return to the Internet‘s inception, when the network backbone was government-owned and operated.493 Cybersecurity considerations
make the prospect worth exploring again.
Inefficient connectivity is a critical component of cybersecurity. Maintaining positive access and alteration requires that
users be able to reach, and interact with, information via multiple pathways. Yet, competitive pressures in the telecommunications industry push in precisely the opposite direction: towards consolidation of routes. Regulatory efforts should thus
subsidize some connectivity directly, require ISPs who peer to
continue peering during disputes, and expand options for carriers of last resort. As the next Section notes, while these measures will greatly augment cybersecurity‘s positive aspects,
they require tradeoffs.
C. SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
Cybersecurity requires hard choices. Like Odysseus confronting the mythical Greek sea monsters of Scylla and Charybdis, avoiding one peril risks another. The tradeoffs in cybersecurity are between the positive and negative ranges of access
and alteration. Storing information in more locations, with
more pathways to it, increases not only the probability that authorized users will engage with it, but that unauthorized ones
will also do so. This inverse relationship is not inevitable, but it
is likely, particularly when cost considerations are added.
Inefficiency does not necessarily increase the risk of negative access or alteration. Organizations could reduce both types
of cybersecurity threats by storing data partially and heterogeneously. This protects information analogously to how the bibliophiles in Ray Bradbury‘s novel Fahrenheit 451 preserve
books in a world where they are banned and subject to destruction.494 Guy Montag, the fireman protagonist, has memorized
the Book of Ecclesiastes.495 His compatriots have committed
492. Id.
493. See MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT 74 –75 (2004) (describing
the pre-Internet network operated by the U.S. Defense Department that connected research scientists in university, military, and industrial sites).
494. RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451, at 35– 40 (1st ed. 1953).
495. Id. at 150.
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other chapters to memory.496 No single person has memorized
the entire Bible, so no single death can delete it from human
knowledge—and, analogously, no single capture provides an attacker with the whole book.497 An inefficiency approach with
partial storage breaks information into pieces that are stored in
multiple locations.498 Consider, for example, an organization
with four information repositories. The organization can split
its data into quarters (A, B, C, and D), and store them with one
quarter per location:
Location 1: A

Location 2: B

Location 3: C

Location 4: D

It can also achieve greater inefficiency, and hence easier
recovery, at the cost of doubling its storage requirements, with
two quarters per location:
Location 1: A, B

Location 2: B, C

Location 3: C, D

Location 4: D, A

A cyberthreat must compromise three of four locations to
reassemble the entirety of the data (although the organization
must also draw information from three places to recover its
data).
An additional way to mitigate inefficiency‘s risks of unauthorized access and alteration is to store information heterogeneously, using multiple operating systems, applications, hardware, and encryption. A vulnerability in one operating system
or application thus could expose part of the information, but
not all of it. Thus, heterogeneity immunizes inefficient storage
from a single attack vector in the way that mixed crop agriculture protects against devastation by a single pest or parasite.499
However, heterogeneity costs more. Most organizations
standardize on a single operating system and application plat-

496. Id. at 153.
497. Cf. id. at 151 (explaining that each book of the Gospels is committed to
memory by different individuals).
498. BitTorrent functions similarly. See Loewenstern, supra note 310.
499. Sandra Díaz et al., Biodiversity Regulation of Ecosystem Services, in 1
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 297, 317 (Rashid Hassan et al. eds.,
2005).
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form—their servers run Windows or Linux, but not both.500
Maintaining multiple variants of each type of program increases the expense and complexity of IT infrastructure.501 Even if
security efforts are effective, they may appear unnecessary—
observers may conclude that threats were overstated, rather
than mitigated. Heterogeneity can be helpful, but it is costly.
This Article‘s proposed inefficiency-based solutions would
improve authorized users‘ abilities to access and alter information. However, there are likely to be tradeoffs between improving cybersecurity‘s positive aspects, and improving its negative
ones. Future work will explore cybersecurity‘s negative aspects.
The next Part argues that an information-oriented theory is vital not only to improving security, but also to preventing a fundamental shift in America‘s attitude towards open communication on the Internet.
V. THE STAKES: RE-FIGHTING OLD WARS
The stakes at issue in which theoretical model we choose
for cybersecurity are considerable. The Internet‘s current core
design permits open, anonymous communication by default—
an architectural choice reflecting key American normative
commitments.502 Cybersecurity risks, though, increasingly
drive demands for reform, especially when posed as threats to
U.S. national security.503 If conventional approaches, with their
emphasis on ascertaining the identity and intent of those creating such threats, hold sway, the U.S. is likely to shift its emphasis from protecting open communication to prioritizing authentication. The consequences would be profound, and
harmful. They would include not only harm to the Internet‘s
generative capacity, but even more importantly to America‘s
role in checking attempts to quell on-line expression, particularly by authoritarian states such as China and Russia.504
500. See, e.g., Tom Duffy, Standard Issue, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 3, 2000,
at 76 (discussing the benefits of system standardization).
501. See, e.g., M. GORDON HUNTER, CONTEMPORARY CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICERS: MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES 61 (2007) (describing how standardization reduced time spent on maintenance and helped control IT costs).
502. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 311, 520 (2002).
503. See Dycus, supra note 22, at 155–56 (―The very future of the Republic
may depend on our ability not only to protect ourselves from enemies armed
with cyber weapons, but also to use such weapons wisely ourselves.‖).
504. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Malte Ziewitz, Jefferson Rebuffed:
The United States and the Future of Internet Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI. &
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These perils underscore the importance of which theory we
adopt to deal with cyber-risks.
The struggle over cybersecurity recapitulates the definitional battles of the early Internet boom, which pitted cyberexceptionalists505 against cyber-realists.506 Although the cyberrealists won that debate, the cyber-exceptionalists had a critical insight: the Internet is more resistant to control than other
communication modalities—in its current form.507 U.S. hegemony over key aspects of Internet architecture has maintained
this implicit preference for free communication over gate keeping, even in the face of dogged criticism and opposition.508
This default freedom to communicate, though, is a relic of
the Internet‘s history. The core protocols were designed primarily by American computer scientists and engineers. It is no accident that the Internet‘s architecture embodies to a considerable degree the American constitution‘s preference and
protections for free expression and access to information.509 The
default position of American constitutional jurisprudence, and
of the Internet‘s design, is to permit communication, including

TECH. L. REV. 188, 203–04 (2007) (explaining the U.S. opposed the internationalization of Internet governance, in part, because it would give nations like
China an opportunity to restrict open communication).
505. See generally David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—
The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that
new rules would emerge to govern the Internet that diverge from the traditional rules of the physical world).
506. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (2006) (arguing that the Internet will be shaped by traditional principles of governance and politics within territorial nations).
507. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 514 –22 (1999) (suggesting steps the government
could take to shape the design of the Internet and increase its regulability).
508. See generally MUELLER, supra note 27, at 62–64 (discussing how the
U.S. government exercises control over Internet governance by being the only
sovereign to supervise the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICAAN)); Mayer-Schönberger & Ziewitz, supra note 504 (recounting
international negotiations on Internet governance conducted at the World
Summit on the Information Society).
509. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding unconstitutional
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 which sought to protect
minors from obscene or indecent material on the Internet); MUELLER, supra
note 493, at 265–66 (―The Internet was the epitome of Jeffersonian
decentralization.‖).
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anonymous communication.510 Deviations from that standard
require special justification, or technological mechanisms.511
Security fears, though, could lead America—no doubt with
reluctance—to prioritize safety over freedom. Pressures to
make the Internet more secure through attribution are mounting.512 They could become irresistible if America suffers a highprofile cybersecurity incident. Security policy is often reactive.
The Transportation Security Administration began screening
airline passengers‘ shoes after Richard Reid attempted to ignite
explosives stored in his sneakers on a flight.513 After a data
spill, the Los Alamos National Laboratory not only banned the
use of flash drives, but filled USB ports on its workstations
with super glue.514 The USA PATRIOT act, with its smorgasbord of law enforcement measures, was passed quickly in the
days following the attacks of September 11, 2001.515 As John
W. Kingdon emphasizes, when a focusing incident creates a policy window, policymakers and legislators generally opt for prepackaged measures rather than crafting responses from
scratch.516 Thus, if conventional methodologies for cybersecurity continue to dominate, the likely response to a significant cyber-incident would be to address those theories‘ core concern:
the lack of attribution in the Internet‘s core design. The prepositioned solution for a cybersecurity problem that attracts
major public notice, and generates demands for a fix, is to
change how the Internet functions.
Such architectural changes will inevitably undercut the
medium‘s power as a communications platform, damaging what

510. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1577–89
(2007).
511. See Network Working Gr, RFC 1958—Architectural Principles of the
Internet, IETF (B. Carpenter ed., June 1996), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1958.txt.
512. See, e.g., Kirsten Doyle, Focus on Cyber War Defence, ITWEB (Oct. 13,
2010), http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
37739:focus-on-cyber-war-defence&catid=69&Itemid=58 (quoting Richard Clark,
Chairman of Good Harbor Consulting, as suggesting the design of ―another,
more secure Internet‖).
513. Pam Belluck & Kenneth Chang, Shoes Were a ‗Homemade Bomb,‘
F.B.I. Agent Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at B1.
514. Daniel Tynan, Closed-Door Policy, FED TECH (Sept. 10, 2007), http://
fedtechmagazine.com/article.asp?item_id=352.
515. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
516. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
165 (2003).
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Jonathan Zittrain calls its ―generativity.‖517 This shift is similar to what Zittrain fears will occur as the result of users‘ security worries, driving them onto locked-down devices such as the
iPad rather than open platforms such as Android.518 However,
the cybersecurity sea change will emanate from the top down,
rather than bottom up; it will originate with governments (especially America‘s), not consumers, and hence is likely to be
more resistant to alteration.
More importantly, the change in American priorities will
significantly re-align stakeholder interests in Internet design.
U.S. control over key Internet architecture has enabled America to resist calls by authoritarian countries to restrict free expression on-line.519 States such as China and Russia work to
control the ambit of Internet communication within their borders, particularly if it seems to threaten internal political hegemony.520 American efforts to embed attribution into the Internet would unintentionally bolster their endeavors. Moreover, it
would provide such states not only with new technological capabilities, but with rhetorical cover: disagreements would shift
from whether to limit communication, to when.521 This normative shift would weaken America‘s advocacy for free expression,
and would align the U.S. in a partnership of convenience with
countries that evince no real commitment to the promise of open
communication. Such changes, and losses, represent the risk of
using law reflexively to regulate cybersecurity without a theoretical orientation that guides its application.
In short, the current design of the Internet, where information routes by default and where security is pushed to the edges
of the network, is a historical accident—an accident that cybersecurity concerns can remediate, to our collective detriment, if
we choose the wrong solutions.

517. Zittrain, supra note 29, at 1980 (―Generativity denotes a technology‘s
overall capacity to produce unprompted change driven by large, varied, and
uncoordinated audiences.‖). See generally ZITTRAIN, supra note 74 (discussing
the characteristics of a generative system).
518. Zittrain, supra note 29, at 2003.
519. See, e.g., Rebecca MacKinnon, China Calls for an End to the Internet
Governance Forum, RCONVERSATION ( May 14, 2009), http://rconversation
.blogs.com/rconversation/2009/05/china-calls-for-an-end-to-the-internet-governance
-forum.html.
520. ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 95, at 209, 449.
521. Cf. Bambauer, supra note 275, at 384 –86 (arguing countries differ
based on the justification for censorship, not on whether to censor).
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CONCLUSION
Preventing cyberattacks is impossible. Retaliation does not
remediate them. Cybersecurity must come to grips with this
reality.
This Article‘s information-oriented theory of cybersecurity
focuses on resilience and recovery, rather than on prevention
and retaliation, as conventional scholarly models do. Computer
software is too complex to hope that systems can be sufficiently
hardened to prevent attacks.522 Knowing that the United States
and Israel are behind the Stuxnet cyberweapon has not helped
Iran‘s nuclear program recover ground. Understanding that
their government intended to prevent them from organizing did
not help Egyptian protesters communicate any more readily. In
short, current approaches to cybersecurity aim at goals that are
nearly impossible to achieve, and unhelpful if attained. The information-focused approach concentrates usefully on identifying, and protecting, what users seek to accomplish on-line.
We should also recognize that law is a limited tool for cybersecurity. Cyberthreats are inherently cross-border, and can
be launched from anywhere with sufficient connectivity. Effective legal regulation thus requires consensus among sovereigns,
whether those sovereigns are nation-states or relevant international bodies such as the United Nations. And states presently
differ about what constitutes cybersecurity. Russia, for example, sees criticism of its government, which it terms ―information war,‖ as a cyberthreat.523 Even the U.S. has mixed incentives for legal regulation: strengthening cyberdefenses could
reduce America‘s vulnerabilities, but also its capability to
mount its own attacks. Ineffective legal measures may be worse
than none at all, as they could generate a false sense of security
while closing the policy window for reform.524
Yet inefficiency holds promise for cybersecurity. It confers
resilience in other contexts. Index funds for stock investing sacrifice the potential for enormous gains to protect against catastrophic losses, as Enron‘s employees learned painfully.525 Er522. Bambauer & Day, supra note 62, at 1062 (discussing vulnerabilities in
operating system (OS) software).
523. Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an ‗Information Weapon,‘ NAT‘L
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=130052701.
524. See KINGDON, supra note 516, at 160 (―Policy windows open infrequently, and do not stay open long.‖).
525. See Martine Costello, Company Stock Slams 401(k)s, CNNMONEY (Dec.
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rors in genetic replication enable adaptation to ecological
changes. The results are not always desirable: BitTorrent‘s inefficient architecture helps downloaders evade copyright infringement liability,526 and the HIV virus benefits from errorprone replication to evade immune system defenses.527 But the
lesson for cybersecurity is clear—inefficiency works.
The next Article in this project will take up the challenges
of cybersecurity‘s negative aspects: preventing unauthorized
access and alteration of information, and detecting when they
have occurred. This Article seeks to define cybersecurity‘s conundrum, and to offer a path to solving it.

10, 2001, 11:59 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2001/12/10/401k/q_401k_lawsuits/
(reporting on the financial losses of Enron employees who held company stock
following Enron‘s collapse).
526. See Ben Jones, Are Private BitTorrent Trackers Safe?, TORRENTFREAK
( Mar. 27, 2007), http://torrentfreak.com/are-private-bittorrent-trackers-safe/.
527. A. Telesnitsky & S.P. Goff, Reverse Transcriptase and the Generation
of Retroviral DNA, in RETROVIRUSES 121, 141 (John M. Coffin & Harold E.
Varmus eds., 1997).

